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INTRODUCTION
Institutions are important to intellectual property.  Information is 
a major subject of exchange, and the special challenges of contracting 
† Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, hesmith@law.harvard.edu.  I would like 
to thank John Golden, the participants at a conference at Boston University, the par-
ticipants at the Symposium on Foundations of Intellectual Property Reform at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review, and especially commentator Philip Weiser, for 
their useful comments and discussions.  All errors are my own. 2084  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
over information have long been at the heart of economic theories of 
contracting.  Exchanges involving information are difficult because a 
buyer will be reluctant to make a purchase without knowing what he is 
buying, but once the seller reveals the information, the buyer will no 
longer need to pay for it.
1  Contractors can also face challenges from 
asymmetric information, and some of the limits on people’s ability to 
contract stem from the problems of incomplete information. 
Where does this leave property?  Although intellectual property is 
technically a form of personal property and some of its mechanisms 
are shared with regular property, commentators have found the no-
tion of intellectual property problematic in a way that regular prop-
erty is not.  Because information itself is nonrival, in that one person’s 
use of it does not diminish the value of another’s use of the same in-
formation, excluding others from information when they could use it 
at zero marginal cost seems wasteful.  And while intellectual property 
is one device among many that could provide incentives to people to 
create information, the nonrival nature of information is a count 
against intellectual property in comparison with rewards, kudos, lead 
times, and other alternatives to appropriating the returns from inven-
tive and other creative activity.  Should intellectual property be prop-
erty at all? 
One might expect the New Institutional Economics (NIE) to be 
helpful in addressing this question.  In this Article, I will argue that 
the NIE is very helpful, but in a less straightforward way than one 
might think.  The NIE shows promise because it is concerned with in-
formation and institutions, including “property rights” and the prob-
lems of contracting.  But the concern in using the NIE to explain in-
tellectual property lies in its generally thin notion of property.  In the 
NIE, property rights are a subset of institutions, which comprise all 
the “rules of the game of a society,” including both formal law and in-
formal norms, all of which are “humanly devised constraints that 
shape human interaction.”
2  But currently a very broad range of insti-
tutions would count as “property rights” in the NIE.  The standard 
1 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY:E CONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 615 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research 1962) (setting out what has come to be 
known as Arrow’s paradox of information). 
2 Douglass C. North, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, in
THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT 17, 23 (John 
Harriss et al. eds., 1995).  See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH,I NSTITUTIONS,I NSTITU-
TIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990). 2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2085
definition of property in the NIE is a right to engage in a set of actions 
with respect to a valuable resource, or the expectation of deriving util-
ity from the use, exchange, or transformation of an asset.
3  This is fine 
as far as it goes, but it leaves several issues unaddressed.  In particular, 
the NIE commonly adopts an extreme version of the bundle-of-rights 
theory of property, under which property is a collection of “rights, 
privileges, duties, and so forth,”
4 with no particular defining charac-
teristics.
5  The list of uses over which the owner has authority corre-
sponds to this collection of sticks from the bundle-of-rights picture in-
herited from the legal realists.  In the case of land, such sticks would 
include the right to build, the right to plant, the right to prevent de-
velopment, and so on.  Using this assumption of a list of uses, the NIE 
does not have much of an explanation for why property rights are, at 
their core, rights to things good against the world (in rem).  This 
problem is especially acute in intellectual property.  A system of re-
wards would be a “property rights system” in the NIE, but it would be 
one very different from patent, copyright, trademark, and the other 
intellectual property regimes with which we are familiar. 
Because the NIE incorporates information costs and bounded ra-
tionality, it has the tools to provide a rationale for intellectual prop-
erty as property.  In particular, because assets are collections of valued 
attributes that are hard to measure,
6 actors face the economic ques-
tion of how to group them—how to aggregate them, or more accu-
rately, how to carve them up—for purposes of delineating property 
rights.  In theory, one could build property up out of the smallest 
sticks, in an additive fashion.  Thus, fee simple ownership of Blackacre 
would be delineated as the sum of the right to exclude, the right or 
privilege to farm (in many different ways), the right to park cars, the 
3 Armen Alchian provides a particularly famous and oft-cited definition.  See Ar-
men A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816 (1965), reprinted in
ARMEN A. ALCHIAN, ECONOMIC FORCES AT WORK 127, 130 (1977) (“By a system of 
property rights I mean a method of assigning to particular individuals the ‘authority’ 
to select, for specific goods, any use from a nonprohibited class of uses.”). 
4 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Eco-
nomics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 364 (2001). 
5 See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 
723-24 (1996) (noting that traditional conceptions of property embrace a bundle-of-
rights model where property is “without any necessary defining features”). 
6 See Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON.
27, 48 (1982) (arguing that the “problems and costs” of measuring the value of assets 
“significantly affect all economic transactions”). 2086  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
right to prevent development (nature preservation of various kinds), 
and so on. 
There are two problems with this bottom-up, stick-by-stick, legal-
realist approach to delineation, and both problems relate to how di-
rectly rights should make reference to valued attributes of assets and 
the uses that people make of them.  First, the bottom-up delineation 
of asset uses is a highly duplicative and needlessly cumbersome way to 
describe the set.  If the law gives a right to exclude (as it does promi-
nently through the doctrine of trespass), supplemented and modified 
with respect to a limited set of uses (i.e., in the law of nuisance, the 
doctrine of necessity, etc.), one can get an extensionally very similar 
set of legal relations at a much lower cost.  Consider situations of ne-
cessity such as the hiker stranded on a snowy mountainside who needs 
the food in an unoccupied cabin or those on a ship who need an-
other’s dock in a storm.  The bottom-up method would treat the 
“breaking in and eating the food” stick or the “docking during the 
storm” stick as no different from any other stick except in its assign-
ment to another party—the one facing the necessity.  In actuality, the 
law gives the owner a presumptive right to exclude and then modifies 
this by removing protection against one facing certain emergency 
situations.  In other words, the law starts out with a cheap and crude 
exclusion regime and in high-stakes situations moves over to a gov-
ernance regime that focuses on particular uses.
7  Where contracting is 
not cost-effective, the governance regime is supplied off the rack.   
This method of presumptive exclusion with refinement through gov-
ernance economizes greatly on delineation and processing costs for 
dutyholders and courts.
8  Many problems are taken care of with one 
stroke through the exclusion strategy, and the delineation effort is 
concentrated where it is most needed.  Overall, the set of sticks in the 
bundle is numerous and factoring out some of their common ele-
ments is economizing. 
7 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA.L .
REV. 965, 975-76 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules] (noting that 
while much of property law is based upon a “rough but basic” exclusionary philosophy, 
“further refinement and precision are sometimes achieved through a supplementary 
governance regime”); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719, 1754 (2004) [hereinafter Smith, Property and Property Rules] (arguing that while 
property law involves a “basic exclusionary system,” “refinement in high-stakes border-
line cases will be necessary”). 
8 See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance:  Two Strategies for Delineating Prop-
erty Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S457-78 (2002) (presenting models that suggest that 
a broad exclusionary philosophy in property law reduces transaction costs). 2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2087
This Article emphasizes methods of economizing on delineating 
property rights that sound in indirectness between the interests served 
and the mechanism by which the interests are secured.  Our interest 
in resources relates to potential and actual uses (i.e., farming, parking, 
etc.).  The exclusion strategy protects these interests in use indirectly, 
without having to delineate them individually most of the time.  The 
right to exclude can also be regarded as the right to determine use, 
but when it comes to delineation, the exclusion strategy often econo-
mizes on cost through its lack of reference to specific uses at all.  By 
invoking the law of trespass, the farmer can prevent damage to crops 
and enjoy the use of the land for farming without the law having to 
make reference to use.  Indeed, trespass law, unlike nuisance, does 
not require allegations of actual harm
9 and, in the absence of proof 
of harm, will afford nominal damages.
10  And although injunctions for 
trespass to land are nominally an exceptional remedy, in practice they 
are quite routine.
11  Trespass law prohibits entry into the column of 
space defined by the ad coelum rule,
12 which sends a simple message 
of “keep off” to outsiders and requires very little contextual informa-
tion for courts.
13  Further, much of the detail that trespass avoids is 
not relevant to outsiders and is not useful much of the time.  So there 
is no sense in delineating various uses separately, and doing so would 
just lead to information overload for outsiders like dutyholders and 
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 163 cmt. d (1965) (“[E]ven a harmless 
entry or remaining, if intentional, is a trespass.”). 
10 In fact, an actor may show “such a complete disregard of the possessor’s legally 
protected interest” in her land as to “justify the imposition of punitive in addition to 
nominal damages for even a harmless trespass.”  Id. § 163 cmt. e. 
11 See, e.g., Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude:  Of Property, 
Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB.P OL’Y 593, 644-46 (2008) 
(describing how courts now grant injunctions for trespass to land as a matter of 
course except when “exceptional situations” merit otherwise). 
12 See Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 7, at 992 & n.80 (“The full 
statement of the maxim is cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos (he who 
owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths).  The maxim is routinely followed 
in resolving issues about ownership of air rights, building encroachments, overhanging 
tree limbs, mineral rights, and so forth, and is subject to certain limited exceptions for 
activities like airplane overflights.”); see also Brown v. United States, 73 F.3d 1100, 1103 
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (“At common law, the owner of real property was considered to own 
from the center of the earth to the top of the sky.” (internal citations omitted)). 
13 See Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property 
Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 13, 16 (1985) (noting that the ad coelum rule involves “[n]o 
weighing or balancing of costs and benefits,” but rather is “exceptionally simple and 
exceptionally rigorous” (internal citations omitted)). 2088  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
courts.  Delineating rights to aggregates of sticks instead of stick by 
stick is more indirect, and it conserves delineation and processing costs. 
There is another sense in which the indirectness of property law 
avoids problems of delineation in terms of the valued uses of re-
sources.  One issue that receives scant attention by bundle-of-rights 
theorists is that their bottom-up strategy presents no principled way by 
which to specify the sticks.  How fine-grained should the sticks be?  Is 
it the right to farm, or the right to plant crops plus reaping, or plant-
ing different crops, and on and on?  Furthermore, once delineated, 
these sticks can be combined and recombined for many different 
purposes, not all of which are known to every actor—or even, at any 
given moment, known to any actor.  As yet undiscovered attributes 
and uses lead to all sorts of timing decisions regarding when to dis-
cover attributes and when to put them to which uses.  Thus, the owner 
as decision maker holds a complex set of options.  Moreover, the uses 
of an asset are not just risky (e.g., with a variance in outcomes forming 
a probability distribution), but uncertain, in the Knightian sense.
14
That is, the set of uses of an asset may not correspond to a known 
probability distribution, and nonowners may not even know the 
members of the set.  Property law helps manage this uncertainty by 
not making knowledge of the uses or even the probability distribu-
tions of their values relevant to dutyholders.  In previous work, I have 
argued that Knightian uncertainty is more conducive to property rules 
than to liability rules, which do require more knowledge of probabilis-
tic information by officials or courts.
15
Crucially, much of the time property forces nonowners not to 
know, and in this sense property involves information hiding, a key 
aspect of modularity.
16  A modular system is one in which interactions 
are intense within components of the system (modules) but are con-
14 See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK,U NCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-20, 197-232 (1921) 
(distinguishing “risk” from “uncertainty” by noting that “uncertainty” is immeasurable 
in principle). 
15 See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 7, at 1724-27 (“Property itself is a 
response to uncertainty, and property rules derive some advantage as a response to 
uncertainty.”).
16 Information hiding and modularity are important in computer programming, 
especially object-oriented programming, which has been an inspiration for application 
of modularity to economics.  See, e.g., GRADY BOOCH,O BJECT-ORIENTED ANALYSIS AND 
DESIGN WITH APPLICATIONS 27 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that object-oriented technology 
encompasses principles of encapsulation and modularity); EDWARD YOURDON,O BJECT-
ORIENTED SYSTEMS DESIGN:A N INTEGRATED APPROACH 6 (1994) (describing “encapsu-
lation,” the ability to modularize components of a system, as one of the “fundamental 
characteristics of an object-oriented approach to developing systems”). 2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2089
strained between modules.
17  This architecture allows activity in one 
module to occur without the need to worry about unanticipated rip-
ple effects.  In a nonmodular system beyond a minimal level of com-
plexity, it becomes difficult to track or even predict the ramifications 
of very local actions.  Whether a system can be modularized depends 
in part on the pattern of interactions between elements, and in par-
ticular whether a system is “nearly decomposable” in Herbert Simon’s 
sense:  parts of the system must have minimal interactions with the 
rest of the system and as a result may be considered modules in which 
internal interaction is intense (and unconstrained), but in which ex-
ternal interaction is limited.
18
When property rights are treated like black boxes in the exclusion 
strategy, the system as a whole benefits from its modular structure.  In-
formation about many attributes and uses of assets does not flow 
across property boundaries.  The set of resource attributes and asset 
uses is a nearly decomposable system.  First of all, dividing the world 
into assets reflects near decomposability.  For small events, what one 
does with one parcel or asset is unlikely to impact the attributes or 
uses of another asset or parcel.
19  Thus the decoupling or asset parti-
tioning, effected by the basic right to exclude and its associated liber-
ties, handles this set of (non)interactions.  Even for interactions that 
17 See Richard N. Langlois, Modularity in Technology and Organization, 49 J. ECON.
BEHAV.&O RG. 19, 19 (2002) (describing a modular system as one in which modules 
“communicate with one another only through standardized interfaces within a stan-
dardized architecture” toward the end of managing complexity). 
18 HERBERT A. SIMON,T HE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 195-98 (2d ed. 1981) (de-
scribing a nearly decomposable system as one “in which the interactions among the 
subsystems are weak but not negligible”); see also 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN &K IM B. CLARK,
DESIGN RULES:T HE POWER OF MODULARITY 65 (2000) (quoting Herbert Simon’s story 
about two watchmakers that illustrated an early theory of modularity); MANAGING IN 
THE MODULAR AGE:A RCHITECTURES,N ETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS (Raghu Garud 
et al. eds., 2003).  Simon’s theory has been expanded upon in a number of different 
contexts. See, e.g., Langlois, supra note 17, at 24-26 (attempting to “find the modulari-
zation that minimizes interdependencies and most cleanly decomposes the system”); 
Ron Sanchez & Joseph T. Mahoney, Modularity, Flexibility, and Knowledge Management in 
Product and Organization Design, 17 STRATEGIC  MGMT. J. (SPECIAL  ISSUE) 63, 64-65 
(1996) (expanding on Simon’s notion of a nearly decomposable system by proposing 
that product and organizational designs “follow the fundamental principles of decom-
position”); Erich Schanze, Legalism, Economism, and Professional Attitudes Toward Institu-
tional Design, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL &T HEOR.E CON. 122, 130-36 (1993) (discussing in-
stitutional modules with regard to professional organizations while noting the 
significance of “structural patterns” of interaction). 
19 See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327-30 (1993) 
(noting that when minor uses of land “have no spillover effects,” private ownership 
“directly and precisely punishes land misuse and rewards productive labor”). 2090  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
might in principle impact each other, the property system sometimes 
suppresses their effects.  For example, in tort law, landowners are not 
required to anticipate the negligence of another actor.
20  So if a rail-
road negligently sends sparks onto a farmer’s land, the farmer need 
not place hay with a view to the likely negligence of the railroad.  The 
farmer’s rights are a black box and the message to the railroad is sim-
ple:  full liability.  The modularity of property rights allows them to be 
indefinite with respect to the set of valued uses.  Modular property is 
characterized by a second-order indirectness in delineation of rights. 
Both kinds of indirectness—the employment of proxies that stand 
in for numerous uses and the hiding of uncertain groups of attributes 
and uses behind boundaries—allow property to maximize the value of 
embedded options.  Option theory has been used to explain the struc-
ture of entitlements.  I will pursue this idea within the NIE in order to 
show how modular delineation with its associated indirectness maxi-
mizes the value of options.  All the uses to which attributes can be put 
in various combinations present real options, and the indirectness of 
property allows the exercise of those options without the high coordi-
nation costs that would be present if every decision could, in principle, 
impact every other decision with respect to other users and attributes. 
Finally, it is this modular indirectness that is property’s main con-
tribution to intellectual property.  In this Article I will argue that these 
two forms of indirectness—first-order indirectness relating to attrib-
utes and second-order indirectness relating to uncertain and open-
ended sets of attributes—are crucial for understanding the contribu-
tion that property makes to intellectual property.  Because these forms 
of indirectness follow from transaction-cost theory in the NIE, the NIE 
has the potential to explain why intellectual property might be use-
fully treated as property in the first place.  This is not to say that these 
tools can, without more, justify the system that we have.  Instead, the 
NIE provides a perspective that needs to be taken into account in fur-
ther empirical and policy-oriented work on intellectual property. 
I. PROPERTY AND INFORMATION COSTS
The notion of property is central to the NIE.  Previous definitions 
of property in the NIE have tended to be hyperrealist in their em-
brace of the bundle-of-rights picture of property.  But adding informa-
tion costs (a central element of the NIE) allows us to define property 
20 See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2091
so as to capture its aggregate aspects—its “lumpiness.”  Both the de-
fault bundle of rights and the set of real options to which it corre-
sponds are lumpy for reasons related to information costs.  Property 
relies heavily on exclusion and a modular structure to delineate op-
tions at a low cost and to preserve options for reconfiguring real op-
tions—i.e., options on options.  Delineation of legal relations has to 
steer between insufficient precision, which fails to promote appropria-
tion, and excessive precision, which stifles flexibility.  Interestingly, 
this information-cost theory of property brings the NIE version of 
property much closer to the legal definition of property than previ-
ously thought. 
A.  Property and Property Rights in the New Institutional Economics 
Property rights are central to the NIE, and sometimes the NIE 
styles itself “property rights economics.”
21  Nevertheless, the NIE has 
traditionally operated using a very broad conception of property that 
does not correspond with the legal definition of property.  There is, of 
course, nothing inherently wrong with this discrepancy, but it is useful 
to consider these broad definitions of property in order to highlight 
the special elements of property that they tend to obscure—elements 
that turn out to be important in explaining the nature of intellectual 
property.
Like much of economics, the NIE is concerned with incentives, 
and, again like economics, the NIE employs the rational-actor para-
digm or one of its behavioral variants.
22  Common to these approaches 
is an underlying premise that actors’ behavior responds to their ex-
pectations, whether the expectations or the response are perfectly or 
imperfectly rational.  This is where property rights enter the picture.  
In the broadest version of property in the NIE, property rights are 
identified with actors’ expectations of deriving value from resources.  
The only difference between property rights and general expectations 
is that the expectation in property should relate to some resource, but 
21 See, e.g., YORAM BARZEL,E CONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 3-4, 10-15 (2d 
ed. 1997) (describing the “property rights approach”); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,M AR-
KETS AND HIERARCHIES:A NALYSIS AND ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 1 (1975) (classifying 
property rights economics as one of the fields having “a bearing on” the “renaissance” 
of new institutional economics). 
22 See generally THRÁINN EGGERTSSON,E CONOMIC BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 33 
(1990); L.J. Alston, New Institutional Economics, in 6 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 32-37 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (provid-
ing an overview of the NIE framework). 2092  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
a resource is simply anything of value.  Thus, ownership of Blackacre 
is interesting insofar as it forms the basis for its owner (and perhaps 
others) to extract value from the land.  But this expectations-based 
notion of property can be quite broad:  one’s expectation of deriving 
value could stem from law or norms or, in the extreme, from physical 
facts about the world.  Thus, in the words of John Umbeck, someone 
may acquire property rights in coconuts “because he is the only one 
who can climb a tree.”
23
Perhaps the most common definition of property in the NIE holds 
that property is a set of expectations to be able to take a permitted set 
of actions with respect to a resource, backed by some normative force.  
These actions are significant because they allow the holders to derive 
value from resources.  The right to cultivate and reap, for example, 
gives the rights holder an expectation of value.  If the rights holder 
also has the right to transfer those rights, she can derive value indi-
rectly from another’s planned use of the resource. 
Closely related to property in the NIE, and a step closer to our ul-
timate concerns, is the notion of a residual claim.  Thus, in NIE fash-
ion, Yoram Barzel “define[s] the economic property rights an individ-
ual has over a commodity (or an asset) to be the individual’s ability, in 
expected terms, to consume the good (or the services of the asset) directly or to 
consume it indirectly through exchange.”
24  Barzel notes the congru-
ence of this definition with a long line of NIE definitions of property 
in terms of the authority to select one of a set of uses.
25  Barzel then 
observes that “[t]he notion of rights is closely related to that of resid-
ual claimancy,”
26 and much of his theory is an explanation of the insti-
tutions that give rise to residual claims over collections of valued at-
tributes.  If an asset is a collection of valued attributes, as Barzel 
assumes,
27 one can explain much of contracting behavior over assets 
as an effort to allocate residual claims in proportion to the actor’s abil-
23 John Umbeck, Might Makes Rights:  A Theory of the Formation and Initial Distribution 
of Property Rights, 19 ECON.I NQUIRY 38, 39 (1981).  Nonetheless, most in the NIE would 
see some humanly created constraint as a necessary condition for an institution and 
particularly for property rights. 
24 BARZEL, supra note 21, at 3. 
25 Id. at 3 n.2; see also Alchian, supra note 3, at 130 (defining a “system of property 
rights” as “a method of assigning to particular individuals the ‘authority’ to select, for 
specific goods, any use from a nonprohibited class of uses”). 
26 BARZEL, supra note 21, at 3. 
27 See Barzel, supra note 6, at 27 (asserting that, because “[p]eople will exchange 
only if they perceive what they get to be more valuable than what they give[,] . . . the 
attributes of the tracked items have to be measured”). 2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2093
ity to affect the mean return from that collection of attributes.  Thus, 
the owner of Blackacre is in the position to affect its mean return and 
has a residual claim on the land—but more subtle residual claims are 
possible.  Where a building owner contracts for fire insurance, for in-
stance, the insurance company may require the installation of certain 
equipment in addition to setting and collecting premiums.  According 
to Barzel, the insurance company has a residual claim on attributes 
relating to fires.
28  Similarly, in a lease, the tenant and the landlord 
each have residual claims over different attributes, depending on the 
nature of the lease in question.
29  For Barzel, as for many in the NIE, 
contracting behavior is central to the theory of property rights. 
Definitions of property in the NIE tend to be very contractarian or 
tort based, in that they focus on the individual uses or attributes that 
remain after contracting ends.
30  This stick-by-stick approach is a leg-
acy of legal realism and has largely characterized transaction-cost eco-
nomics since Coase, who adopted a hyperrealist version of the bun-
dle-of-rights picture of property.
31  For Coase, property was the tort-
like resolution for deciding who had control over a list of activities; 
apart from the need for stability, it was not at all important or desir-
able to speak in terms of ownership. 
This realist picture overlooks an important aspect of property:  its 
in rem nature.  Property rights bind people generally.  If I own Black-
acre, all others have a duty to keep off.  This is not the be-all and end-
all of property, but it is important, especially where property forms the 
basis of expectation between anonymous parties.
32  Also, the in rem 
aspect is related to property’s heavy reliance on rights to exclude from 
defined things.  A right to a defined thing is easy to communicate to a 
wide and diverse audience of dutyholders and officials, some of whom 
will have no personal dealings with the owner.  If I pass parked cars in 
a parking lot, for example, I know not to take them; it does not matter 
28 BARZEL, supra note 21, at 60. 
29 See id. at 33-54 (detailing the kinds and benefits of tenancy conyracts). 
30 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 376-77 (characterizing Barzel’s definition of 
property as fundamentally premised on notions of contract). 
31 See id. at 366 (noting that Coase’s definition took “the realists one step further, 
implicitly conceiving of property as a list of particularized use rights that individuals 
have in resources”). 
32 See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property:  Form, Context, and Audience, 55 
STAN.L .R EV. 1105, 1151-53 (2003) (analyzing the costs of communicating information 
about legal rights to audiences of various sizes); see also Smith, supra note 8, at S468-69 
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if they are owned by a person or a corporation, what the owner’s fea-
tures are, what possible leases or bailments may exist, and so on.
33
But what is a thing?  It can be regarded as the asset implicitly de-
fined in the exclusion strategy:  the parcel of land, the car, the inven-
tion.
34  Some things come predefined by our everyday experience and 
others do not.  The inventions of patent law require a great deal of de-
lineation effort in the way that a chair or even a parcel of land does not.
35
Things in property are closely identified with its modular struc-
ture:  modules track the things defined by the exclusion strategy.  In 
deciding what should count as a thing, Simon’s concept of near-
decomposability is helpful.
36  For Simon, a nearly decomposable sys-
tem is one in which interactions between proper subsets of the system 
are internally multiplex and intense but sparse between such subsets.  
One can draw boundaries around such subsets and allow only certain 
defined types of interactions, because the number and intensity of the 
interactions is low from the start.  These components of the overall 
system are modules. 
Property accomplishes something similar.  The exclusion regime 
defines a thing and its boundary, with trespass, nuisance, and other 
doctrines adjusting the rights and duties of owners forming the inter-
face among property modules.  Like the NIE, we take assets to be ag-
gregates of valued attributes, but the primary focus here is on how this 
aggregation is accomplished.  Which attributes should go with which?  
All else being equal, complementary attributes should be grouped to-
gether.
37  Otherwise the interface among property rights will have to 
control many spillovers or be subject to intense contracting.  Relat-
edly, an asset boundary should correspond to the optimal scale of 
use.
38  Otherwise, spillovers and contracting are again needlessly 
33 See, e.g., J.E. PENNER,T HE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 75-76 (1997). 
34 See Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 7, at 1767 (noting that the exclu-
sion strategy “sweeps a broad class of uses into the definition of the entitlement”); 
Henry E. Smith, Self-Help and the Nature of Property, 1 J.L. ECON.&P OL’Y 69, 106 (2005) 
[hereinafter Smith, Self-Help] (arguing that an exclusion strategy leads to a broad defi-
nition of property). 
35 See Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:  Delineating Entitlements in In-
formation, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1795-97 (2007) (describing how patent law involves high 
delineation costs). 
36 SIMON, supra note 18, at 193-229. 
37 See Smith, supra note 8, at S471 (“[W]e would expect a tendency to see the 
world carved up into assets that embrace complementary sets of attributes . . . .”). 
38 See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons, Semicommons 6-10, in R E-
SEARCH HANDBOOK IN THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. 
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prominent.  The boundaries should occur where interaction is corre-
spondingly sparse and weak. 
Mixing exclusion with governance manages the complexity of ac-
tors’ interactions through property’s modularity.  A complex system is 
one in which internal interactions are many and multiplex such that it 
is difficult to infer the properties of the whole from the properties of 
the parts.
39  A nearly decomposable system consists of a pattern of in-
teractions where module boundaries can be drawn so that interactions 
are intense within the module but sparse and constrained among 
modules.  This allows for information hiding:  decisions in one mod-
ule can be made largely without considering what is happening in 
other modules; the only constraint is satisfaction of the interface con-
ditions.  Modularity has been a key concept in many areas ranging 
from evolutionary biology to cognitive science, software, and organiza-
tion theory.  To take one example, teams writing software tend to be 
modular, often reflecting the structure of programs.  In a nonmodular 
structure, any part could potentially impact every other, requiring su-
perhuman efforts at acquiring and tracking information. 
The traditional view of markets has a strongly modular flavor, and 
one role of modular property is to support markets.  On Adam 
Smith’s account, each actor need only consult that actor’s own self-
interest against the background of the market and will be guided as if 
“by an invisible hand” toward actions that contribute to efficiency.
40
The informational responsibility of each actor is limited and local.   
Likewise, Hayek’s theory of markets as devices for processing informa-
ownership and utilization as two means of dealing with the pattern of scale); Dean 
Lueck, The Economic Nature of Wildlife Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 291, 300-03 (1989) (apply-
ing theories of asset boundaries to wildlife ownership). 
39 SIMON, supra note 17, at 195. 
40 1 ADAM SMITH,A N INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 477 (E. Cannan ed. 1976).  
 As every individual, therefore, endeavors as much as he can both to employ 
his capital in the support of domestic industry, and so to direct that industry 
that its produce may be of the greatest value; every individual necessarily la-
bours to render the annual revenue of the society as great as he can.  He gen-
erally, indeed, neither intends to promote the public interest, nor knows how 
much he is promoting it.  By preferring the support of domestic to that of for-
eign industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry 
in such a manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only 
his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand 
to promote an end which was no part of his intention. 
Id.2096  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
tion employs what we would call modularity.
41  Each market actor pos-
sesses local knowledge about her use of resources but needs only con-
sult prices in order to make economizing decisions about the acquisi-
tion and use of those resources.  The information that each actor uses 
can impact prices, but no other actor need know it.  As the interface 
conditions among participants in the market, prices allow other in-
formation to be hidden.  By contrast, the central planner is nonmodu-
lar and is expected to gather and act on all this information, without 
any interaction between two pieces of information being ruled out in 
principle.  The NIE points to the importance of many institutions for 
market exchange.  In this Article, I suggest that modularity is characteris-
tic of one of these supporting institutions:  the law of property. 
However, the kinds of interactions facilitated by modular property 
extend beyond the market.  Again, the warnings to potential thieves 
against trespass and theft partake of modularity.  Property law man-
ages much complexity through modularity.  The exclusion strategy, 
with its presumptive right to exclude, is the starting point in property, 
and the effect of this strategy is to economize on information costs.  In 
effect, the exclusion strategy allows the system of resource usage to 
manage complexity with modularity, with much information hidden 
in property modules.  In trespass to land, the unauthorized crossing of 
a boundary serves as a (very) rough proxy for harmful use; any volun-
tary entry into the column of space defined by the ad coelum rule 
counts as a trespass.
42  “Keep out” is a simple message that is part of a 
first-cut delineation of rights.  Thus, from the dutyholder’s perspec-
tive, property is like a black box—a module—in that much informa-
tion about uses and users is simply irrelevant to the dutyholder’s duty 
of abstention.  Only in specific contexts does the law inquire into uses 
more directly, such as when one landowner produces odors that an-
noy a neighbor; these governance rules of nuisance law can be 
thought of as the interface between adjacent bundles of rights.
43
Nonetheless it is the exclusion factor that keeps the bundles lumpy 
and opaque, operating as modules in which interactions and interde-
41 See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM.E CON.R EV. 519, 526 (1945) 
(describing a system in which relevant facts are dispersed and processed by individual 
actors).
42 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
43 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-36 (1913), reprinted in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CON-
CEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS 23, 36-42 (Wal-
ter Wheeler Cook ed., 1923) (describing the interrelation of rights, privileges, duties, 
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pendencies are intense inside but sparse across the interface connect-
ing the modules.  Actions within a module do not have hard-to-predict 
ripple effects through the entire system.  On the information-cost 
theory, the combination of exclusion and governance in property fur-
nishes modules and interfaces for actors who take potentially conflict-
ing actions with respect to resources. 
This modular structure can be easy to overlook.  If a given asset is 
considered a separate thing, a security interest makes reference to 
that cluster of attributes and not to another.  For example, if A has a 
security interest securing a loan to B, the treatment of A and the fluc-
tuations in value are what matter to A; A can concentrate on A’s asset 
without needing to know as much about other assets that B may own 
or B’s relations with other creditors.  Likewise, the owner of a related 
but separate asset need not worry about the security interest.
44  This 
asset-partitioning function of property forms the basis of Hansmann 
and Kraakman’s property-related theory of corporate law,
45 in which 
actors can safely ignore information in a way that is not possible in the 
absence of asset partitioning.  Thus, if an airline and a storm-door 
company are within one firm, those dealing with each business must 
know about the other one.  In separate firms, specialization of infor-
mation can occur.  In particular, the creditors of the firm know that 
the personal creditors of its owners (and the creditors of its supplier, 
the creditors of its employees, and so on) cannot reach the firms’ as-
sets, an organizational style that Hansmann and Kraakman call “af-
firmative asset partitioning.”
46  Conversely, in other organizational 
forms, the creditors of the firm cannot reach the assets of the owners.  
They call this “defensive asset partitioning,” and it is usually known as 
corporate limited liability.
47  The effect of asset partitioning is to make 
44 The monitoring-cost theory of security interests thus depends on the modular 
effect of property rights.  See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial 
and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 58 (1982) (explaining secured debt in terms of spe-
cialization of monitoring by secured creditors); cf. Thomas H. Jackson & Anthony T. 
Kronman,  Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE  L.J. 1143, 1154 
(1979) (“[T]he debtor can be expected to give a security interest to C1. . . when C2
either needs to do less monitoring, or is able to monitor more cheaply, than C1.”).  But
see, e.g., Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND.L .R EV. 1051, 1055-
59 (1984) (critiquing Levmore’s monitoring theory as underdeveloped). 
45 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational 
Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (theorizing that organizational law is fundamentally 
concerned with “the creation of a pattern of creditors’ rights” and arguing that it 
should thus be considered more akin to property law than to contract law). 
46 Id. at 394-95. 
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the shareholders’ interest (and those of other stakeholders) more 
modular:  no shareholding depends on the creditworthiness of other 
shareholders. 
It is worthwhile to note that even in property proper, asset parti-
tioning is only possible because the set of things, actors, and interac-
tions among them is a nearly decomposable system, and property law 
serves to modularize this complex system.  From the point of view of 
dutyholders, on the outside, much of what goes on in these property 
modules is irrelevant:  again, parked cars are not to be taken, regard-
less of the status of the owner or the owner’s planned uses.  Much of 
the decision making by an owner need not take account of the inter-
nal workings of another asset because they are separate assets.  This 
black-box approach is taken further than those with a focus on torts 
would expect.  Tort scholars express surprise that a property owner is 
not responsible for minimizing the damage from an external actor’s 
negligence.
48  In the famous case of LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago, Milwau-
kee & St. Paul Railway,
49 a farmer was not held responsible for the dam-
age caused by a fire that started when the hay that he stacked near the 
boundary of his land was ignited by negligently spewed sparks from a 
passing train.  The railroad had a duty to respect the farmer’s prop-
erty, and each actor’s calculation was simplified by treating the 
farmer’s choices as irrelevant from the railroad’s point of view.  Like-
wise, whether a bailee is liable to the bailor is irrelevant to whether a 
48 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Dikes, Dams, and Vicious Hogs:  Entitlement and Ef-
ficiency in Tort Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 35–38 (1989) (discussing the lack of con-
tributory negligence as a defense where real property is involved); see also Mark F. 
Grady, Common Law Control of Strategic Behavior:  Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 15, 30-37 (1988) (noting that railroads typically have not been able to use 
the defense of contributory negligence when setting farmers’ property on fire even 
when such property was placed dangerously close to railroad tracks). 
49 232 U.S. 340 (1914).  Wood’s treatise gives a classic formulation: 
It is the duty of every person or public body to prevent a nuisance, and the 
fact that the person injured could, but does not, prevent damages to his prop-
erty therefrom is no defense either to an action at law or in equity.  A party is 
not bound to expend a dollar, or to do any act to secure for himself the exer-
cise or enjoyment of a legal right of which he is deprived by reason of the 
wrongful acts of another. 
1 H.G. WOOD,AP RACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NUISANCES IN THEIR VARIOUS
FORMS;I NCLUDING  REMEDIES  THEREFOR AT LAW AND IN EQUITY § 435 (Bancroft-
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third-party tortfeasor is liable to the bailee for destruction of personal 
property.
50
Things form the basis for the residual claim, which is also ex-
plained by information-cost theory.  Recall that in the NIE the resid-
ual claim is closely identified with property.  The question is why con-
trol and the residual do—or should—go together.  Some deny that 
they should, as in the stakeholder approach to corporate law where 
the board of directors is seen as a mediating hierarch and no spe-
cial control rights go to shareholders or other residual claimants.
51
But much work in the NIE views residual claims and control as de-
scriptively going together, and theorists have sought an explanation.  
The most common conclusion is that the residual goes to the actor 
who makes the most important contribution or who is most vulnerable 
to opportunism.
52
Recall that in Barzel’s theory, the residual over a set of attributes 
goes to the one who is in the best position to affect its mean return.
53
In other words, residual claims follow control.  But if this contribution 
were easy to measure, one could pay it off just as the other contribu-
tions.  Closer to the information-cost theory is Barzel’s hypothesis that 
the residual goes to the contribution that is hardest to measure, with 
entrepreneurs therefore getting the residual (i.e., the cash flow from a 
firm after all the other claimants have been paid off).
54  Interestingly, 
50 See The Winkfield, [1902] P. 42, 56 (C.A.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (rejecting 
jus tertii defense). 
51 See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate 
Law, 85 VA.L .R EV. 247, 305 (1999) (suggesting that the mediating-hierarchy model 
supports the long-term interests of shareholders); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad 
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL.L .R EV. 1189, 1208 (2002) (discounting ar-
guments advanced regarding shareholder primacy as empirically hollow). 
52 See, e.g., Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and 
Economic Organization, 62 AM.E CON.R EV. 777 (1972) (describing the residual claimant 
as one with incentives to reduce shirking and with the most significant management 
potential); D. Bruce Johnsen, The Quasi-Rent Structure of Corporate Enterprise:  A Transac-
tion Cost Theory, 44 EMORY L.J. 1277, 1354-56 (1995) (noting that the assignment of re-
sidual claims occurs based on value flows).  See generally Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &E CON. 297 
(1978); Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance, 43 J. FIN.
567, 576-82 (1988) (presenting a theory of the residual claim based on one’s vulnerabil-
ity to opportunism). 
53 See supra text accompanying notes 24-29. 
54 Yoram Barzel, The Entrepreneur’s Reward for Self-Policing, 25 ECON.I NQUIRY 103 
(1987); see also Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 52, at 782 (hypothesizing that the resid-
ual claimant will be the monitor of the organization responsible for metering the pro-
ductivity of individual inputs to the team’s output). 2100  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
this is slightly different from his theory of residual claims in property.  
The difficulty of measurement helps to explain this difference.  Most 
concisely, if the residual is what remains after paying other claims, it 
requires no additional measurement.  All one needs is the outer 
boundary of the firm module (or asset module, in a property context) 
after the subtraction of all the other payments (sticks)—the residual is 
what is left.  Of course, the value of the whole will fluctuate for a vari-
ety of reasons, including the activities of the residual claimant.  How-
ever, the use of the residual claim obviates the need to separate these 
out.  While this means that the residual claimant will sometimes bene-
fit from windfalls,
55 it also means that the holder of the residual is ex-
posed to exogenous risk as well.  For highly risk-averse parties, being a 
residual claimant may not be worthwhile even if the cost savings from 
measuring the actor’s contribution in the residual fashion (i.e., the 
asset as a whole minus payments to other actors) would be large.  In 
some models that trade off agency costs and manager risk aversion, it 
is the risk aversion that explains why a manager is not the residual 
claimant.
56  Indeed, an entrepreneur differs from a manager partly in 
a willingness to be exposed to exogenous risk as well as the results of 
the entrepreneur’s own entrepreneurial activity. 
In the NIE, governance rules would count as property rights and 
there would be nothing special about exclusion, but I argue that the 
exclusion approach is itself an economizing move.  Exclusion serves as 
a shortcut for a more clearly articulated set of detailed governance 
rules.  Our interactions can be relatively anonymous precisely because 
they are mediated by a thing (e.g., the cars in the example above).  
The focus on exclusion for reasons of simplicity and cheapness only 
makes sense because of positive transaction costs—here broadly taken 
to include the nonzero cost of delineating property rights.
57  In a 
55 Some theorists have argued that the law should do more to separate out wind-
falls for taxation or other special treatment. See, e.g., Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J.
1489, 1566 (1999) (noting that an optimal tax theory would entail efficient capture of 
windfalls); Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman & Steve Thel, Of Equal Wrongs and 
Half Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 757-63 (2007) (advocating for a “split the difference” 
approach to private windfalls).  However, the information-cost theory suggests how dif-
ficult this would be in many contexts. 
56 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN.E CON. 305, 348-49 (1976) (noting 
that some owners “have only a relatively small fraction of their wealth invested in the 
organization they manage” and arguing that risk aversion can explain owner-manager 
diversification in part). 
57 See, e.g., Douglas W. Allen, What Are Transaction Costs?, 14 RES.L .&E CON. 1, 3-4 
(1991) (arguing that transaction costs are better defined as the costs of establishing 2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2101
world of zero transaction costs, we might accept for all purposes the 
economists’ definition of a property right as a right to take one of a 
list of actions with respect to a thing—with such a thing being merely 
a backdrop to the direct specification of what actions are permissible 
as between any pair of members of society.  But in our world of posi-
tive transaction costs, specifying all of the actions that each actor in 
society may take with respect to each other is not cost effective.  More-
over, the architecture of property law in terms of exclusion and gov-
ernance implements a modular structure that helps to manage the 
complexity of actors’ interactions with respect to resources. 
B.  Information Costs and the Structure of Entitlements 
Previous theorists of “entitlement structure” have found option 
theory to be a useful tool for analysis and an inspiration for ever more 
elaborate schemes of liability rules.  Liability rules are options to pur-
chase entitlements nonconsensually (calls) or, less familiarly, options 
to force a sale on some other actor (puts).  I argue, however, that enti-
tlement structure should instead be analyzed in terms of real-option 
theory.
58  The theory of real options applies tools for analyzing and 
valuing financial options to the decisions that actors take outside of 
financial markets, such as opening a new plant or pursuing a line of 
business.  Real-option theory has direct relevance to the entire set of 
entitlement structures, not just remedies, because the decisions that 
an owner might or might not make correspond with real options—
when to build, when to farm, whether to repair, and all the myriad 
uses that might or might not be made of an asset—and these decisions 
correspond in interesting ways with the entitlement structure that 
serves these interests.  Likewise, creating and developing information 
involves real options in which the investment aspect is readily appar-
ent.
59  The real-option theory, in conjunction with information costs, 
can be used to explain the structure of the intellectual property enti-
tlements that facilitate those decisions.  Our interest in resources cor-
responds to real options and the question becomes how entitlement 
property rights, in the economist’s sense of a de facto ability to derive utility from an 
action, rather than narrowly as the costs of exchange); Steven N.S. Cheung, The Trans-
action Costs Paradigm, 36 ECON.I NQUIRY 514, 515 (1998) (“‘Transaction costs’ must be 
defined to be all the costs which do not exist in a Robinson Crusoe economy.”). 
58 See, e.g., AVINASH K. DIXIT &R OBERT S. PINDYCK,I NVESTMENT UNDER UNCER-
TAINTY (1994). 
59 See, e.g., PHILIPP  N. BAECKER,R EAL  OPTIONS AND INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY:
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structure serves those interests.  In the next Part, I will show how this 
happens indirectly in intellectual property, but the indirectness be-
tween interests (real options) and the property mechanisms that serve 
them is crucial, if less extreme, in the case of tangible property.  In 
this Section, I will argue that an indirect and modular structure helps 
to maximize the value of these embedded options—our ultimate in-
terest in resources—in a way very different from the entitlement the-
ory that emerges in the options-related, liability-rule literature. 
The bundle-of-rights theory can be viewed through the lens of 
real-option theory.  Particularly through the study of remedies in the 
property-rule/liability-rule framework of Calabresi and Melamed 
(C&M),
60 theorists have analyzed various types of liability rules as op-
tions, but interestingly, these theorists believe that an option-like ap-
proach to liability rules determines the nature of “entitlements.”
61
The use of the term entitlement suggests that these theorists subscribe 
to the bundle-of-rights picture in which entitlement structure is quite 
flexible.  Indeed “entitlements” are merely empty boxes with no par-
ticular content, just like property rights in most versions of the NIE.
62
Thus, if A has “the entitlement” (whatever that is) protected by a li-
ability rule with respect to B, A can take the entitlement upon pay-
ment of officially determined damages (Rule 2).  If that is the case, 
then B has a call option to purchase the entitlement for the amount of 
the damages.  Others have entertained the possibility of liability rules 
based on put options, where the holder of the entitlement can force a 
sale on another.
63  This device is used in a limited way in unjust-
enrichment cases and border encroachments, but not in generalized 
60 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV.L .R EV. 1089, 1106-10 (1972).  Calabresi 
and Melamed also identified and analyzed inalienability rules, under which transfers of 
entitlements are prohibited.  Id. at 1111-15. 
61 See IAN AYRES,O PTIONAL  LAW:T HE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL  ENTITLEMENTS
(2005); Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV.L .R EV. 1399, 1405 (2005) (ar-
guing that “entitlements could be restructured to exploit the revealing potential” of 
option agreements, which offers “a middle ground between property rules and liability 
rules”); Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822 (1993). 
62 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 4, at 385 (“Property rights are simply ‘entitle-
ments,’ little empty boxes filled with a miscellany of use rights that operate in the 
background of a world consisting of nothing but in personam obligations.”); Smith, 
Self-Help, supra note 34, at 70-76 (arguing that entitlements do not actually show the 
degree of symmetry suggested by a traditional law and economics approach). 
63 See, e.g., AYRES, supra note 61, at 22; Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 
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in rem contexts.
64  For one thing, the information for which a duty-
holder is responsible under a put-style rule is greater than under a 
call-style liability rule.  A nonowner who wants to avoid dealings with 
the asset and its owner need only avoid them in the case of the call, 
but the nonowner is always potentially on the hook under the put.  
This type of unknown—and possibly unknowable—information in the 
in rem context would require massive amounts of information gather-
ing, wasteful avoidance efforts, and debilitating uncertainty. 
While the C&M-inspired literature purports to be about entitle-
ment structure, it actually focuses on remedies.  Like C&M, theorists 
in this literature regard the issue of resource conflict as involving an 
initial question of who should get “the entitlement,” and then move 
on to how it should be protected (e.g., through property rules, liabil-
ity rules, or inalienability, and, if a liability rule, which of the many 
types of liability rules).  This does not go far enough.  The image here 
is of the state parceling out options in a stick-by-stick fashion.  But this 
is not the way the law works.  Instead, the law provides for lumpy enti-
tlements based on a first-cut exclusion strategy, which is then refined 
to take into account various kinds of nuisance, necessity, and so on.
65
Actors thus have a limited ability to modify the package of rights 
through easements and licenses.
66  Property law furnishes a basic 
modular structure complete with interfaces that individual actors have 
limited discretion to modify. 
II. UNCERTAINTY,O PTIONS, AND ENTITLEMENTS IN INFORMATION
Entitlement structure can be analyzed usefully in terms of real op-
tions because entitlements correspond to the actions that people 
might take with respect to resources and to the timing of those deci-
sions.  But a closer look at the implications of real-option theory and 
entitlements suggests why entitlements do not work in the stick-by-
stick manner assumed and elaborated by the liability-rule theorists.   
Instead, a combination of real-option theory and the information 
64 See Richard A. Epstein, Commentary, Protecting Property Rights with Legal Remedies:  
A Common Sense Reply to Professor Ayres, 32 VAL.U .L .R EV. 833, 845-52 (1998) (noting 
that the common law has only rejected put options in extremely limited circumstances, 
involving private property). 
65 See Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 7, at 970-74 (noting that “nui-
sance law rests on a foundation of exclusionary property rights”); Smith, supra note 8, 
at S485 (noting that “exclusion is often the first, low-cost (but low-precision) cut at  
defining and defending a resource”). 
66 One such modification is to contract for an option to purchase. 2104  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
costs in NIE points to powerful reasons for the lumpiness and modu-
larity of property rights, with an indirect correspondence between le-
gal relations and real options.  This information-cost theory suggests a 
role for lumpy entitlements in information as a means for appropriat-
ing returns in a complex system of dispersed inputs to innovation and 
commercialization. 
A.  Options and Modular Entitlements 
In real-options theory, the lumpy entitlements themselves can be 
analyzed in terms of options, but the picture that emerges is different 
from that of the liability-options theorists.  What is within this lumpy 
bundle?  In terms of who gets to do what, the full Hohfeldian analysis 
would break down ownership into a complex assortment of rights, 
privileges, powers, and immunities (as well as duties, no-rights, liabili-
ties, and disabilities).
67  Because the aim of Hohfeldian analysis is to 
break down legal relationships into their smallest parts, each of these 
parts corresponds to a basic action that the actor in the relation might 
take.  In other words, in the fully decomposed Hohfeldian analysis, 
pieces correspond to real options.  The exercise of a right or a privi-
lege is an option to prevent use or to engage in use, respectively.  A 
power is an option to change an existing legal relation, and an immu-
nity is the ability to exercise an option free of another’s power.  Each 
of these can be regarded either as an option or as closely identified 
with an option. 
But the problem with this atomizing view, for our purposes, is that 
there may well be no unique way of decomposing a legal relation, and 
the bundle of real options is not uniquely defined in the correspond-
ing way either.  In other words, the bundle of legal relations called 
“property” and the set of real options to which it corresponds are both 
lumpy:  in terms of delineation, the package is not built up stick by 
stick or option by option.  Take rights and privileges.  Many privileges 
are implicitly protected by the right to exclude.
68  Only when we need 
67 See Hohfeld, supra note 43, at 28-59 (devising a relational “scheme of ‘opposites’ 
and ‘correlatives’” consisting of eight basic conceptions in law, with the ultimate aim of 
“exhibit[ing] not only their intrinsic meaning and scope, but also their relations to 
one another and the methods by which they are applied, in judicial reasoning, to the 
solution of concrete problems of litigation”). 
68 See Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 7, at 978-79 (noting that many 
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to focus particularly on some uses does a right to use need to be sepa-
rately delineated. 
Further, how finely to characterize options and legal relations de-
pends on the purpose at hand:  should it be the right to farm, the 
right to plant, the right to plant tomatoes, the right to hoe, etc.?  The 
groupings of these options will impact value, and the problem of op-
tion characterization becomes complex.  Even from a static point of 
view, some options may be incompatible with others, and some com-
binations are more valuable than others.
69  In the case of land, this 
might be hunting and grain-growing, but not vice versa.  This dynamic 
point of view is particularly relevant to intellectual property, in which 
combinations may only be possible or desirable in certain sequences, 
making the set of possibilities even larger.
70
Interestingly, whether property is shaped by true Knightian un-
certainty also has implications for how we think of entitlement struc-
ture in terms of real options.  Like the liability-rule literature, the ex-
isting methods for valuing options presume risk rather than 
uncertainty.
71  Even if other sources of “uncertainty” are added, for in-
terest rates or changes in the variance itself, the theory is still based on 
risk, not uncertainty.  Some theorists have tried to model Knightian 
uncertainty in options theory by using a multiple-priors utility model 
in which the multiple priors are subject to aversion.
72  With uncer-
tainty aversion, waiting tends not to be as advantageous as on standard 
models, because uncertainty aversion may overcome the value of 
69 For a set of n uses taken r at a time, the number of combinations is as follows:   
n!/((n – r)!r!). 
70 The number of permutations (ordered combinations) is n!/(n–  r )!.  So if the 
options in question include all the permutations, we have to multiply the number of 
possibilities by a factor of r!. 
71 In the Black-Scholes formula, means and variance are based on a normal distri-
bution.  Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities,
81 J. POL.E CON. 637, 642 (1973); Robert C. Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 
BELL J. ECON.&M GMT.S CI. 141, 161 (1973).  Likewise, in the Monte Carlo simulation 
model, the value of the stock or other source of value is modeled as having a known 
mean and variance, based again on a normal distribution.  DON L. MCLEISH,M ONTE 
CARLO SIMULATION &F INANCE (2005); Phelim P. Boyle, Options:  A Monte Carlo Ap-
proach, 4 J. FIN.E CON. 323, 324-27 (1977). 
72 Uncertainty aversion or ambiguity aversion is often illustrated by the Ellsberg 
Paradox, in which people will value a gamble on a draw of equal numbers of black and 
red balls more than a gamble on an unknown proportion of balls.  Daniel Ellsberg, 
Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. ECON. 643, 650-56 (1961); see also JOHN 
MAYNARD KEYNES,AT REATISE ON PROBABILITY 75-76, 315 & n.2 (1921) (calculating the 
effects of uncertainty and risk on decision making). 2106  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
keeping an option open.
73  But the concern there is with capturing 
uncertainty aversion rather than the full range of responses—
institutional and psychological—to uncertainty.
74
More useful for our purposes is a combination of uncertainty in 
real options with the Austrian theory of entrepreneurship.  Perhaps 
the greatest significance of uncertainty in real options is that different 
actors will vary in their ability to handle the uncertainty.  After all, 
Knight originally developed the concept of uncertainty in order to 
explain the possibility of profit,
75 and theorists later have stressed un-
certainty when explaining the role of entrepreneurs.
76  Further, the 
process of discovering the attributes of a resource can be regarded as 
an example of entrepreneurship.
77  For property, and intellectual 
property especially, the discovery of options (rather than the meas-
urement of the value of options based on known risks) is something 
that the indirect modular structure of property tends to foster. 
The problem of embedded options as the set of interests to which 
property must respond, directly or indirectly, is compounded by the 
interactions between the various options.  Lon Fuller recognized this 
problem in law decades ago and, borrowing from Polanyi, labeled it 
“polycentric.”
78  Fuller’s first example is somewhat analogous to the 
73 See Jianjun Miao & Neng Wang, Risk, Uncertainty, and Option Exercise 2 (Boston 
Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper WP2007-016, 2007), available at http://people. 
bu.edu/maioj/optionR14.pdf  (explaining that uncertainty reduces option value). 
74 See, e.g., Larry G. Epstein, A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion, 66 REV.E CON.
STUD. 579, 579-81 (1999) (proposing a definition of uncertainty aversion that aligns 
more appropriately with the Savage framework); Larry G. Epstein & Martin Schnieder, 
Recursive Multiple-Priors, 113 J. ECON.T HEORY 1, 20 (2003) (extending the Gilboa-
Schmiedler “atemporal model” and creating the authors’ own “axiomatic model of dy-
namic preference”); Larry G. Epstein & Tan Wang, Intertemporal Asset Pricing Under 
Knightian Uncertainty, 62 ECONOMETRICA 283 (1994) (presenting “a formal model of 
asset price determination in which Knightian uncertainty plays a role”); Itzhak Gilboa 
& David Schmeidler, Maxmin Expected Utility with a Non-Unique Prior, 18 J. MATHEMATI-
CAL ECON. 141 (1989) (extending the classical notion of expected utility with an 
axiom of uncertainty aversion). 
75 KNIGHT, supra note 14, at 20. 
76 E.g., ISRAEL M. KIRZNER,C OMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 78 (1973); Is-
rael M. Kirzner, Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market Process:  An Austrian 
Approach, 35 J. ECON.L IT. 60, 69-71 (1997). 
77 Cf. Kirsten Foss & Nicolai J. Foss, Resources and Transaction Costs:  How Property 
Rights Economics Furthers the Resource-Based View, 26 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 541, 542 (2005) 
(noting that resource attributes can lead to value creation); Smith, Property and Property 
Rules, supra note 7, at 1724-25, 1729, 1781 (noting the entrepreneurial role of an 
owner in the presence of uncertainty over uses of property). 
78 See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.L .R EV. 353, 394-
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problems of managing uses of an asset, or, more accurately, how to 
aggregate sticks—here paintings—into a bundle: 
Some months ago a wealthy lady by the name of Timken died in New 
York leaving a valuable, but somewhat miscellaneous, collection of paint-
ings to the Metropolitan Museum and the National Gallery “in equal 
shares,” her will indicating no particular apportionment.  When the will 
was probated the judge remarked something to the effect that the par-
ties seemed to be confronted with a real problem.  The attorney for one 
of the museums spoke up and said, “We are good friends.  We will work 
it out somehow or other.”  What makes this problem of effecting an 
equal division of the paintings a polycentric task?  It lies in the fact that 
the disposition of any single painting has implications for the proper 
disposition of every other painting.  If it gets the Renoir, the Gallery may 
be less eager for the Cezanne but all the more eager for the Bellows, etc.  
If the proper apportionment were set for argument, there would be no 
clear issue to which either side could direct its proofs and contentions.  
Any judge assigned to hear such an argument would be tempted to as-
sume the role of mediator or to adopt the classical solution:  Let the 
older brother (here the Metropolitan) divide the estate into what he re-
gards as equal shares, let the younger brother (the National Gallery) 
take his pick.
79
Note that the problem of combining uses is likely to be at least as 
complex as Fuller’s painting-allocation task, considering that there are 
also timing and simultaneous compatibility issues.  Fuller’s second ex-
ample concerns the difficulty of central planning, and again the paral-
lel between the liability-rule literature and central planning has been 
noted before:  liability rules require a schedule of official prices and 
must respond in a dynamic fashion to the complex interaction of eco-
nomic effects of resource use, technological change, and so on.
80
Fuller, in general, found the allocation of economic resources to be 
too polycentric for adjudication.
81
The exercise of the real options associated with a resource is also 
polycentric and raises the concerns expressed by Fuller.  Liability-rule 
schemes are modular in that they have to assume some asset aggrega-
79 Id. at 394 (citations omitted). 
80 See Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal Delegation and Decoupling in the Design 
of Liability Rules, 100 MICH.L .R EV. 1, 10 (2001) (discussing dual-chooser rules for par-
ties as a system of centralized planning); Smith, Property and Property Rules, supra note 7, 
at 1778-79 (noting a parallel between the centralized-planning aspect of liability rules 
and “socialism with prices”). 
81 Fuller, supra note 78, at 400 (“Generally . . . problems in the allocation of eco-
nomic resources present too strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable for adjudication.  
Thus, a proposal made in England after World War II that scarce newspaper print be 
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tion (although without telling us where disaggregation is to stop), and 
they rely on context-stripping devices like average values.
82  In their 
limited way, they delegate decisions to actors—as in Fuller’s cake-
cutting solution (A cuts, B chooses).  But I argue here that greater at-
tention to asset definition and protection reveals their role in manag-
ing complex systems through modularity. 
The type of polycentric task that worried Fuller and the problems 
of managing property options more generally are likely to be compu-
tationally complex.  Modularity cuts down on the ripple effects from 
connectedness.  In a system of n elements, the maximum number of 
links is n(n – 1)/2, which increases much faster than in typical modu-
lar systems.
83  Problems involving these interactions are the subject of 
computational-complexity theory, the study of the minimum running 
time for programs to solve various problems.
84  The superficial sim-
plicity of a problem is no guide to its complexity, and many simple-
sounding problems are provably intractable, with many in a class that 
is probably intractable.
85  Of particular relevance to the selection of 
uses are combinatorial optimization problems.  For example, in one 
version of the Knapsack Problem, one has to choose from a given set 
of n items, with given weights and values, the combination that has the 
maximum value but a weight under a given limit.  Like enumerating 
the subsets of a given set, this problem requires exponential time as n
increases.  This problem is probably intractable and requires ap-
proximate methods—or changing the problem and managing the 
82 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules:  An 
Economic Analysis, 109 HARV.L .R EV. 713, 719-20 (1996) (presenting a model in which 
liability rules based on average expected harm are more efficient than property rules). 
83 See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts:  Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 
MICH.L .R EV. 1175, 1182-84 (2006) (depicting graphically the webs of hierarchical or-
ganizations and the connections therein). 
84 See, e.g., MICHAEL R. GAREY &D AVID S. JOHNSON,C OMPUTERS AND INTRACTABIL-
ITY:A G UIDE TO THE THEORY OF NP-COMPLETENESS (1979); RAYMOND GREENLAW &H .
JAMES HOOVER,F UNDAMENTALS OF THE THEORY OF COMPUTATION:P RINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE 287-313 (1998).  For an application of the computational-complexity theory 
to law, see Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Complexity of Laws:  The Implications 
of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997). 
85 See GREENLAW &H OOVER, supra note 84 (discussing NP-complete problems, i.e., 
those that are nondeterministic polynomial complete, or computable in polynomial 
time using a random choice of solutions with complete luck, which are considered 
probably intractable).  For an informal introduction to the P-versus-NP problem, see 
KEITH  DEVLIN,T HE MILLENNIUM  PROBLEMS:T HE SEVEN  GREATEST  UNSOLVED 
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complexity through modularity.
86  And in the case of selecting a use of 
an asset, there may be more than one constraint. 
Finally, as Fuller noted, polycentric tasks often, but not always, in-
volve a multiplicity of parties—the Knapsack Problem and Fuller’s ex-
ample of the paintings passing under a will, for example, do not—but 
to the extent that property among other things deals with the interac-
tions of owners with the world at large (as opposed to in personam 
contracts), property helps manage this highly polycentric system in an 
extremely modular fashion by making the interface among such 
anonymous interacting parties very simple. 
Furthermore, the entrepreneurial aspect of asset ownership in-
volves the exercise of options to create options.  This extra level of 
uncertainty likely requires highly specialized and local knowledge.   
The creation of options might be expected to occur within one or a 
few property modules.  The question is how best to find shortcuts and, 
equally important, who is in the best position to find them.  Modular-
ity theory suggests that over a large range of problems, specialization 
through delegation to owners is beneficial.
87  Modularity and informa-
tion specialization can be accomplished through delegation to owners. 
The problem of entrepreneurship raises the question of whether 
delegation though modularity is truly possible in principle.  It might 
be thought that the information required to set up a modular archi-
tecture for the innovation and commercialization environment would 
be the same as that required to delineate narrow entitlements, im-
plement a system of rewards, or engage in ex post restitution-style 
tracing.  Although the question of the amount and type of informa-
tion required to solve these architectural problems is an empirical 
one, there is no necessary identity of the information required to solve 
specific problems of developing information assets and the information 
needed to set up the modular architecture of the overall environment. 
An analogy to computer programming is apt:  designing a com-
puter language is responsive to what people will do with it, but creat-
ing the language requires different, and far less, information than it 
would to foresee all the things that programmers will ever do with it.  
It is no accident that modularity plays an increasingly important role 
in the use of computer languages, especially with the rise of object-
86 In other words, this version of the Knapsack Problem is NP-complete. 
87 Cf. BALDWIN &C LARK, supra note 18, at 5 (analyzing the evolution of computers 
as an example of successful “modularity in design”). 2110  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
oriented programming.
88  Another analogy is to the Internet.  Central 
control of the basic architecture—including its modularity and, very 
importantly, the nature of its interfaces—is essential to its success.
89  But 
these design questions do not require omniscience about all the uses 
to which these basic tools are put. 
More generally, information is a good like water or broadcast 
spectrum, in that it is difficult to delineate rights to it and many of its 
potential uses are tightly interconnected.
90  This suggests both a possi-
ble limit on the degree of modularization and the idea that some ar-
eas of intellectual property are more susceptible to modularization 
than others.  The question ultimately comes back to Simon’s near de-
composability:  is the system of interactions such that a “fault line” can 
be found or imposed on the system at an acceptable cost?
91  Finding 
algorithms for determining the best modularization of a complex sys-
tem is an active area of research.
92
88 See supra note 16. 
89 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and 
Open Access Policies:  Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age,
17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85, 90-96 (2003) (recounting how the basic architecture of the 
Internet was a controlled government project); James B. Speta, A Common Carrier Ap-
proach to Internet Interconnection, 54 FED.C OMM. L.J. 225, 246-47 (2002) (explaining how 
the standardization of connection protocols facilitated flexibility with network com-
munication); Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 
COLUM.L .R EV. 534, 536 (2003) (discussing the development of the Internet under the 
guidance of the U.S. government). 
90 See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett, Spectrum Tragedies, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 242, 261-66 
(2005) (analyzing the role of exclusion and governance in the radio spectrum); James 
B. Speta, Spectrum Policy Experiments:  What’s Next?, 2008 U. CHI.L EGAL F. 389, 413-14 
(arguing that “spectrum policy has not grown” even though there is agreement that 
traditional models are “outdated”); Dale B. Thompson, Of Rainbows and Rivers:  Lessons 
for Telecommunications Spectrum Policy from Transitions in Property Rights and Commons in 
Water Law, 54 BUFF.L .R EV. 157, 160-61 (2006) (analogizing spectrum regulation to 
water law); Philip J. Weiser & Dale Hatfield, Spectrum Policy Reform and the Next Frontier of 
Property Rights, 15 GEO.M ASON L. REV. 549, 605 (2008) (noting how “holdup-type be-
havior” by incumbents explains the need for telecommunications regulation to address 
connectivity). 
91 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
92 See, e.g., Aaron Clauset et al., Finding Community Structure in Very Large Networks,
70 PHYS.R EV. E 066,111-1 (2004) (presenting a “hierarchical agglomeration algo-
rithm”); M.E.J. Newman, Modularity and Community Structure in Networks, 103 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD.S CI. U.S. AM. 8577, 8581-82 (2006) (describing the implementation of a 
special modularity-based algorithm); Martin Rosvall & Carl T. Bergstrom, An Informa-
tion-Theoretic Framework for Resolving Community Structure in Complex Networks, 104 PROC.
NAT’L ACAD.S CI. U.S.A. 7327 (2007) (approaching this problem by determining an 
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Thus, in patent law, patent rights may foreclose some interactions, 
which must be put on the ledger and set off against the benefits of 
modularity that are the focus of this Article.  But it should be remem-
bered that whether modularization is possible depends more on the 
degree of decomposability of the system of interactions with respect to 
information and its development, and not so much on the initial im-
pression of complexity.  Second, in many of the systems that I have 
termed “fluid”—water, broadband spectrum, wild animals, and infor-
mation—the system of interfaces is a semicommons, with exclusion on 
one scale for some set of uses and a more complex interface on an-
other scale for a somewhat separate, but potentially interacting, other 
set of uses.
93  To take an intellectual property example, Robert Merges 
has shown how patent holders subscribe to norms of sharing in an 
academic context and paid licensing for commercial purposes.
94  In 
joint ventures, the participants may reserve their assets for some pur-
poses and contribute them for others in a semicommons.
95  These ar-
rangements are more complex than pure exclusion regimes, and can 
be thought of as regimes in which exclusion gives way to governance 
quickly because of the high costs of using exclusion, but they too are 
modular, only less so.  In previous work, I have focused on the prob-
lem of containing strategic behavior across the interface between the 
two interlocking systems.
96  In the case of the medieval and early mod-
ern open-field system, scattering of strips was, I argue, used to prevent 
participants from engaging in strategic use of the commons to favor 
what would be their parcels in the grain-growing periods.
97
Furthermore, modular systems either can be designed or evolve 
spontaneously, or some combination of the two.  Indeed one of the 
advantages of modularity is that it can adapt to shocks:  under a wide 
93 See Henry E. Smith, Governing Water:  The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 
ARIZ.L .R EV. 445, 475-77 (2008) (explaining how the exclusion and governance of wa-
ter property rights tend toward a semicommons where common and private property 
interact). 
94 See Robert P. Merges, Property Rights Theory and the Commons:  The Case of Scientific 
Research, SOC.P HIL.&P OL’Y, Summer 1996, at 145, 150 (noting that “patented re-
search results are often shared”). 
95 Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131, 166-67 (2000). 
96 See id. at 169 (arguing that participants, rather than courts, would have an advan-
tage in arranging an “optimal combination”). 
97 For an explanation of the medieval open-field system and of scattering, see id. at 
134-38.  For an interpretation of why scattering of strips was a solution to the semi-
commons, see id. at 144-54. 2112  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
variety of circumstances, systems evolve toward modularity.
98  Whether 
the intellectual property system itself—its architecture—should fall 
more on the designed or spontaneous end of this spectrum is a ques-
tion that I leave open, but a few property analogies are suggestive.  To 
the extent that the system is one of simple building blocks that can be 
combined in many ways, in generative fashion, it is easier to see how 
the state would have some advantage in setting the list of allowed 
building blocks (numerus clausus).
99  Because additional idiosyncratic 
blocks (basic forms of entitlement) raise information costs for those 
who need to avoid violation, those who would like to acquire, and 
those seeking to build on intellectual property, it is convenient for 
one authority—the legislature—to limit these forms.
100  There are 
probably economies of scale and scope in the operation of the nume-
rus clausus.  But intellectual property is not the same as regular prop-
erty.  For one thing, the audiences in intellectual property vary a great 
deal:  anyone can be a copyright violator, though competitors tend to 
be the potential infringers of patents.
101  Further, problems of strategic 
behavior, to which I return later,
102 need not be identical to those in 
real property.  An emerging theme in intellectual property, and pat-
ent law in particular, is concern about strategic behavior.  It remains 
an open empirical question whether the problem of opportunistic in-
vocation of rights, especially against those without good notice and af-
ter detrimental reliance (such as incorporating an invention into a 
98 See, e.g., Lauren W. Ancel & Walter Fontana, Plasticity, Evolvability, and Modularity 
in RNA, 288 J. EXPERIMENTAL ZOOLOGY 242, 281 (2000) (suggesting that modularity 
arises from environmental canalization of RNA); Nadav Kashtan & Uri Alon, Spontane-
ous Evolution of Modularity and Network Motifs, 102 PROC.N AT’L ACAD.S CI.U . S .A M.
13,773, 13,777 (2005) (finding that “modularly varying goals” in biological networks 
can lead to “spontaneous evolution of modular network architectures”); Günter P. 
Wagner & Lee Altenberg, Complex Adaptations and the Evolution of Evolvability, 50 EVO-
LUTION 967, 972-74 (1996) (reviewing multiple genetic models to explain modular de-
sign’s evolutionary origin). 
99 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property:  The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 49-51 (2000) (arguing that the 
widespread historical use of numerus clausus by governments suggests that it has advan-
tages over purely private ordering). 
100 See id. at 42 (finding that advances in technology that lower information costs 
diminish the need for standardization of law); see also Clarisa Long, Information Costs in 
Patent and Copyright, 90 VA.L .R EV. 465, 489-95 (2004) (describing observers of intellec-
tual property as avoiders, transactors, and builders, where rules to reduce information 
costs will not be equally effective). 
101 Smith, supra note 32, at 1175 (contrasting the audiences in copyright and pat-
ent law by emphasizing the ease with which an individual can violate copyright protection). 
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product or a standard), warrant additional efforts to define rights bet-
ter ex ante or some safety valve ex post (the traditional role of equity). 
An important issue faced by entitlement systems as well as com-
puter languages, the Internet, and water law, is the tension between 
static and dynamic efficiency.  In many situations, narrow tailoring 
may optimize a system for present uses but contribute to difficulty in 
changing the system architecture, including remodularization.  As a 
historic example, the open-field system was an ingenious and complex 
system for managing strategic behavior in which agriculture was best 
conducted on two modes and on two corresponding scales:  private 
strips for grain-growing temporally alternating with open-field animal 
grazing.  With technological advances, such as new crops and agricul-
tural methods, the system was difficult to change precisely because the 
governance system of interfaces among tightly interlocking entitle-
ments was very elaborate.  Similarly, water rights in prior appropria-
tion wring out more use of water with doctrines like no-injury-to-
return-flow, under which an appropriator cannot change a use (in-
cluding by transfer) if it would harm return-flow that has been appro-
priated by downstream actors.
103  This no-injury rule maximizes the set 
of present uses but makes adjustment more difficult.  Fluid property 
regimes face an especially harsh tradeoff between tailoring and rich 
interfaces to maximize the value of current uses of the resource and 
the problem of rigidity and obstacles to transfers of rights or negotiat-
ing a remodularization. 
B.  Managing Complexity Involving Information 
The debate within the liability-rule literature over entitlement as-
signment is somewhat misleading in that such literature generally as-
sumes that the entitlement refers to the ability to engage in an activity 
or a narrow set of activities.  Both the NIE definitions of property dis-
cussed above and the entitlement approach can usefully be supple-
mented with a theory of entitlement delineation based on information 
costs.  In particular, entitlements benefit from indirectness and modu-
larity in a fashion that is somewhat obscured by the realist bundle pic-
ture assumed by both mainstream NIE and the liability-rule theorists. 
103 See, e.g., Ronald N. Johnson et al., The Definition of a Surface Water Right and 
Transferability, 24 J.L. & ECON. 273, 279-83 (1981) (discussing water transfer and third-
party impairment); Smith, supra note 93, at 453-55, 469-71 (discussing rights, transfer, 
and deprivation of water of other appropriators under the Demsetz framework). 2114  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
Exclusion and modularity help maximize the value of options.  In 
a zero-transaction-cost world there would be less need to make the dis-
tinctions that lie at the heart of the information-cost theory of prop-
erty.  As Baldwin and Clark point out, the basic unit of economic activ-
ity involving more than one actor is the transfer.
104  Actor A can 
transfer material, energy, or information to actor B.  An example 
would be a team of smiths transferring a pot hook to a team of cooks, 
as well as the many transfers within each of those teams.  In principle, 
any actor on either team might interact with any other member of ei-
ther team in any way imaginable.  It is conceivable that allowing some 
interaction between the decisions of the cooks and the smiths would 
have a nonzero benefit, and in a zero-transaction-cost world, the sys-
tem of formal transactions could track exactly the set of transfers.  In 
our positive-transaction-cost world, though, transactions are costly; 
some transfers do not correspond to formal transactions and may not 
occur at all.  Thus, the team of smiths and the team of cooks are sepa-
rated into modules because the interactions between the teams are 
sparse, and except for the transfer of design requirements, the pay-
ment from cooks to smiths, and the transfer of the pot hook in the 
other direction, any of the other possible transfers can be sacrificed at 
little cost.  In Simon’s terms, the smith-cook system is nearly decom-
posable.
105  Other than the design parameters, the smiths need not 
worry about what goes on in the kitchen, and, as long as the trans-
ferred pot hook meets the stated requirements (on the interface be-
tween the smith module and the cook module), the cooks need not 
know anything about the process of manufacture.  Each team can spe-
cialize informationally, which is like the specialization of labor but in-
volves expertise and the crucial coordination of actors with different 
and incomplete information.
106  The actors can each exercise their op-
tions to undertake actions within their respective spheres without re-
gard to the opinions or actions of the members of the other team.  
Transactions are limited to those allowed by the interface. 
If in a zero-transaction-cost world not all transfers correspond to 
transactions, we can generalize this point to legal relations.  In a zero-
transaction-cost world all real options would be visible to the law and 
104 Carliss Y. Baldwin & Kim B. Clark, The Option Value of Modularity in Design:  An 
Example from Design Rules, Volume 1:  The Power of Modularity (Harvard Negotiation, 
Orgs. & Mkts. Research, Paper No. 02-13, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract 
=12404. 
105 See supra notes 17-18 & 36-37 and accompanying text. 
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would correspond to a legal relation, at least as long as there were 
some positive benefit in doing so.  Thus, even within the teams in the 
smith-cook example, one can think of the internal dealings of the 
smiths as the exercise of real options.  For example, actions such as 
cleaning or replacing the forge, or creating new tongs, are all the ex-
ercise of real options.  This would be true even if there were only one 
smith.  In a world of zero transaction costs we might think of each of 
these actions and transfers as corresponding to some legal right that 
could be transferred or operated on in every way imagineable.  But in 
a positive-transaction-cost world, these real options would be far too 
costly to serve as the basis for such fully articulated legal relations.  In-
stead, legal relations also track a modular structure to economize on 
transaction costs. 
Property is characterized by a large gap between the mechanisms 
that it employs and the interests that it serves.  Thus, the right to ex-
clude is not beneficial per se; only a fetishist would deem exclusion to 
be the interest to be served by property.  Instead, people have inter-
ests in using (including preserving) assets, either directly or indirectly, 
through transfer.  The trilogy of rights of possession, use, and transfer 
reflects more closely the interests that people have in resources rather 
than a theory of an unadorned right to exclude.
107  But when it comes 
to delineation, the information-cost theory suggests why exclusion is a 
starting point:  it employs rough proxies that serve as a first cut at pro-
tecting a wide and indefinite set of interests in use.  Because it is un-
der- and (especially) overinclusive, the exclusion strategy is supple-
mented with governance regimes such as nuisance, covenants, zoning, 
the law of necessity, and various customs of access and responsibility.  
To those with an exclusive focus on the interests to be served by prop-
erty, this emphasis on exclusion is an inconvenient obstacle.  And it is 
difficult to understand the importance of exclusion without a theory 
of why the gap between means and ends produces any gains. 
107 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (stat-
ing that a more accurate conception of property rights is an individual’s right to pos-
sess, use, and dispose); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,C OMMENTARIES *138-39 (discussing an 
individual’s right of property as “free use, enjoyment, and disposal”); RICHARD A. EP-
STEIN,T AKINGS:P RIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 22 (1985) 
(citing Blackstone’s conception of property); Eric R. Claeys, Takings:  An Appreciative 
Retrospective, 15 WM.&M ARY BILL RTS. J. 439, 442 (2006) (discussing Richard Epstein’s 
book and its idea of property rights as “possession, use, and control”); Adam Mossoff, 
The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the Administrative State, 157 U. PA.L .R EV. 2001, 
2007-19 (2009) (discussing the bundling metaphors and exclusion conceptions of 
property).2116  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
The gap between delineation (means) and interests (ends) is even 
starker in intellectual property.  Here, exclusion is costly because of 
the nonrival nature of information.  If an additional person can use 
the information at zero marginal cost, excluding anyone from the in-
formation makes little sense in terms of direct interests. 
An analogy to water rights is helpful:  Like water, information is 
difficult to subject to property rights because it is costly to measure.  
And certain uses of water, such as power generation, have some pub-
lic-goods characteristics.
108  Accordingly, riparianism has major com-
mon property elements.
109  However, I suggest a different analogy be-
tween water and intellectual property.  In some areas, it was cheaper 
to delineate rights to water by owning the land around a water source, 
which afforded de facto rights over the water even if it was not techni-
cally susceptible to ownership claims.
110  In the case of intellectual 
property, the ability to delineate rights in the inputs to invention and 
commercialization is costly—especially against remote parties—and it 
appears that sometimes it is cheaper to delineate rights in related in-
formation in order to capture (indirectly) those inputs.  The inputs 
are rival and are a good candidate for property rights on the benefit 
side, but they are not susceptible to narrowly tailored property rights 
on the cost side.  One solution—albeit, with its own costs—is to give 
rights over the output (or some other related asset) as a proxy for the 
too-costly narrower rights to inputs.  Here is where intellectual prop-
erty potentially comes into play.  Remote indirect rights to informa-
tion look bad on their own terms because they incur the cost of exclu-
sion from a nonrival resource, but they can be a cheaper stand-in for 
the right to the rival resources used as inputs to invention and   
commercialization. 
In particular, patent law is a characteristic response to the limits of 
the traditional equity approach to property.  For example, equity re-
lied heavily on tracing rules,
111 and we conceivably could use such an 
108 See Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-Law Water 
Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261, 291-92 (1990) (suggesting that eastern riparian law de-
veloped around an aspect of water use for power generation rather than for individual 
consumption). 
109 Id.
110 See George Cameron Coggins & Margaret Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public 
Rangeland Management II:  The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 24-25 (1982) 
(noting that control of scarce water resources led to exclusion of others from adjacent 
public land). 
111 See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS,L AW OF REMEDIES:D AMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 6.1 
(2d ed. 1993) (discussing the necessity of tracing); Peter Birks, Mixing and Tracing:  2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2117
approach to give the productive employers of rival inputs to invention 
and commercialization a return by tracing the beneficial effects into 
the assets and consumption of others.  This system of allocation would 
be prohibitively expensive.  One reason that tracing works in the con-
text of equity and unjust enrichment is that the relation between the 
tracer and the tracee (including some of those to whom one can fol-
low an equitable claim) is limited, and great attention is paid to en-
sure that the one against whom tracing (or following) is used is well 
aware of the claim.  Often this is done by reserving these devices for 
use against clear wrongdoers and then making tracing easier by resolv-
ing questions against the wrongdoer.  Consider one who wrongfully 
takes $100 and commingles it in a bank account already containing 
$400 belonging to the wrongdoer.  If the wrongdoer then withdraws 
$100 and bets it successfully at the racetrack, winning another $200, 
the unjust enrichment claimant can claim $300.  If on the other hand 
the horse (and wrongdoer) loses, the unjust enrichment claimant 
should receive $100 from the account.  These harsh presumptions are 
appropriate where a sanction rather than a price is being imple-
mented.  But, if one were to use tracing-based, equity-style claims as a 
substitute for intellectual property, such draconian presumptions 
would usually be inappropriate.  In actuality, the appropriate sphere, 
in terms of a nearly in personam relation, full information, and 
wrongdoing, would be the law of unfair competition and misappro-
priation, which are not coincidentally outgrowths of equity. 
Thus while intellectual property may be consistent with a restitu-
tionary impulse,
112 this is only indirectly true.  Intellectual property 
bears only an indirect relation to restitutionary ends, because a more 
direct approach would be prohibitively costly.  Intellectual property 
allows the exercise of real options involving rival inputs and the ap-
propriation of the value of exercising those options by giving exclu-
sion rights over downstream information assets. 
There are two choices that we need to make to determine the 
proper mechanism.  One is whether rights will be defined ex ante or 
Property and Restitution, in 45 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 69, 84 (1992) (exploring tracing 
in restitutionary claims); Peter B. Oh, Tracing, 80 TUL.L .R EV. 849, 876 (2006) (ex-
amining remedial tracing in equity and at common law). 
112 See Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:  Intellectual Property and the Restitu-
tionary Impulse, 78 VA.L .R EV. 149, 157 (1992) (analyzing basic features of intellectual 
property through the lens of restitution). 2118  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
ex post.  In other words, should the rights be rules or standards?
113
Another choice is whether to grant indirect or direct rights.  And, 
given the imperfection of proxies, often an indirect right must be 
broader than a direct one.  For a given rival input to commercializa-
tion, it is unlikely that a perfect indirect proxy can be found.  For an 
entire collection of such rival inputs, it is even more likely that no sin-
gle accurate proxy will be found and that any proxy will be broad if 
one is to be used at all.  These two choices provide a two-by-two matrix 
as follows: 
Ex Ante  Ex Post 
Direct
Trademark, 
Plant Protection, 
Anti-Plug-Mold 
Unfair Competition 
Indirect  Patent X
Patent law is the solution to the problem that is ex ante and indi-
rect or broad.  If it were narrower it would be similar to trademark, 
plant protection, or anti-plug-mold statutes which are ex ante but 
which make reference to much narrower information assets or to in-
dividual activities.  By contrast, whereas patent law is ex ante and indi-
rect, the opposing area of law in both respects—ex post and narrow—
is unfair competition.  Related areas of law such as copyright and 
trade secret are somewhere in between.  What we seem unable to find 
are broad and ex post regimes.  A very expansive reading of Interna-
tional News Service v. Associated Press
114 would be such a regime, because 
in that (equity) case the Court employed commercial morality to de-
clare a quasi-property right against use of hot news by a competitor 
news organization. A generalized version of this approach would pose 
a number of related threats.  First, the burden would fall on a large 
class of dutyholders (in rem) without giving much guidance as to the 
liability.  Second, a broad version of INS would derogate seriously 
from the public domain.  In particular, if equitable notions of tracing 
and resolving doubt in favor of the claimant carry over, the public 
113 See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 
557, 568-88 (1992) (analyzing rules versus standards in terms of the timing of decision 
making).
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domain is bound to lose.  Indeed, such an approach suffers from the 
problem of overexpansive equity that the common law lawyers and 
their descendants have raised against equity itself, from the “Chancel-
lor’s foot” onward.
115  The general question is the right mix of law and 
equity.  For present purposes, we must ask if patent law’s combination 
of a relatively ex ante delineation and indirectness between the 
mechanism employed and the interests served makes sense. 
III. APPLICATIONS
The information-cost theory allows us to draw out some implica-
tions of recent developments in the law regarding the licensing of in-
tellectual property, and patents in particular.  It also suggests the na-
ture of the tradeoff presented by the choice between injunctions and 
damages as remedies for patent infringement. 
A.  Licensing 
Licensing has implications for the modular structure of intellec-
tual property.  First, licensing is a way of modifying the interface be-
tween different actors.  There is no guarantee that the off-the-rack 
pattern of ownership of intellectual property assets is optimal. 
Licensing supports and is supported by modular intellectual 
property rights.  Indirect intellectual patent rights allow transacting 
parties to cooperate without delineating the rights to their inputs, 
which is important in joint ventures.  Each of the participants in a 
joint venture can use its rival inputs to develop and commercialize a 
combination of joint and individual projects at low delineation cost.  
It is not that exclusive rights to information are useful per se.  Rather, 
the importance of the asset-partitioning function of intellectual prop-
erty is partly that related rival assets and inputs can be partitioned si-
115 See JOHN SELDEN,T ABLE TALK xxxviii, at 43-44 (London, E. Smith, 1689) (“Eq-
uity is a Roguish thing:  for Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is ac-
cording to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, 
so is Equity.  ’Tis all one as if they should make the Standard for the measure we call a 
Foot, a Chancellor’s Foot; what an uncertain Measure would be this.  One Chancellor 
has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a Third an indifferent Foot:  ’Tis the same thing 
in the Chancellor’s Conscience.”); see also Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alli-
ance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 332-33 (1999) (Scalia, J.) (holding that because 
equity at the time of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 did not include issuing prelimi-
nary injunctions to freeze unrelated assets in cases claiming only money damages, fed-
eral courts do not have such power). 2120  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
multaneously.
116  In this way the partitioning effect and the attribution 
of returns in a team-production-type problem are closely related.
117  As 
modularity promotes specialization in organizations and production 
teams generally,
118 there is evidence that intellectual property rights 
promote specialization in firms.
119
The modular structure of exclusion-based intellectual property 
rights also makes other types of contracting more tractable.  Robert 
Merges has argued that intellectual property rights facilitate contract-
ing by making precontractual liability possible and enforcement more 
flexible.
120  Sometimes this is possible precisely because intellectual 
property rights serve as a convenient reference point, even prior to or 
apart from any need to delineate more accurate provisions relating to 
particular possibly unforeseeable (rival) inputs.  For example, intellec-
tual property rights can simplify the law of employee inventions.
121  If 
independent invention were a defense to patent law, it would be very 
difficult to allocate rights as between employers and employees with-
out the constant threat of defection. 
All of this is not to say that intellectual property rights are always 
necessary or desirable, or that stronger is always better.  It does sug-
gest that, in considering the empirical question of what kinds of rights 
make sense, the modular structure of intellectual property rights po-
tentially carries benefits.  Otherwise, the indirectness between the 
mechanism and its purpose—an indirectness even greater than the 
sometimes controversial indirectness in regular property—appears as 
116 See Paul J. Heald, A Transaction Costs Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 
480-84 (2005) (arguing that patent registration lowers the costs of asset partitioning 
for certain information assets). 
117 Id. at 487-99 (discussing benefits of a patent registration system in address-
ing team production issues involving intellectual property). 
118 See BALDWIN &C LARK, supra note 18. 
119 See Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property Rights, and 
Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS.&C ORP.C HANGE 451, 452 (2004) (arguing from model and 
suggestive empirical literature that strong intellectual property rights lead to speciali-
zation in firms); see also Daniel W. Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for 
University Inventions, 63 J. ECON.B EHAV.&O RG. 688, 691 (2007) (finding in a study of 
university inventions that a patent is associated with a doubling of the likelihood of 
finding a licensing partner and arguing for the role of reduced risk of expropriation, 
lesser uncertainty, and inventor incentives). 
120 See Robert P. Merges, A Transactional View of Property Rights, 20 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1477 (2005) (arguing that intellectual property promotes transactions through its 
role as property). 
121 See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L.
&T ECH. 1, 53-54 (1999) (explaining how intellectual property law solves problems in 
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an unmitigated problem.  And pointing to incentives does not provide 
a complete explanation.  Going back to the NIE definitions of prop-
erty rights, if we knew the mean return from assets and all options 
were known and could be valued, there would be far less reason to 
have a property rights system—rather than some system of direct re-
wards or restitution with tracing—for information at all. 
One main issue here is notice and, in particular, the most cost-
effective method of furnishing it.  Although systematic and centralized 
property records often do provide effective notice (most notably in 
the case of land
122), it is an empirical question as to how they stack up 
against other methods in any given situation.
123  Other methods in-
clude standardization, equitable doctrines of notice (which apply in 
personam and not in rem), and doctrines absolving from liability 
those who encounter rights.  Where a legal device falls between in 
personam contract and in rem property, we should expect intermedi-
ate strategies to deal with the potentially large, but still limited, set of 
dutyholders.
124
When notice is the issue, it is important to keep in mind that it is 
not information that is scarce but rather attention, as Herbert Simon 
pointed out a long time ago.
125  Thus, even where land records or no-
tices printed on a product may give notice in some sense, there might 
still be reasons to force a standardized format (similar to, for instance, 
nutrition information, or the terms of consumer loans).  Even the 
land records are not a “data dump” but limit the types and form of 
documents that are permitted to be recorded.  Format can matter.  
For example, a rule that rent is incompatible with fee ownership 
means that once one knows that an interest is a fee simple, one can 
stop looking for information along this dimension.  Similar problems 
122 Cf. Alfred F. Conard, Easement Novelties, 30 CAL.L .R EV. 125, 131-33 (1942) (ar-
guing that enforcement of easements should not be objectionable on grounds of nov-
elty as long as there is notice); Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the 
Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL.L .R EV. 1353, 1354 (1982) (arguing for freedom of contract 
in the area of covenants and easements as long as land records provide notice). 
123 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 99, at 43-45 (describing other methods of meet-
ing third-party informational needs). 
124 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 
COLUM.L .R EV. 773, 776-77 (2001) (discussing the differences in the legal doctrines 
associated with areas mixing contract rights and property rights due to the costs and 
benefits associated with different types of rights). 
125 See Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, in
COMPUTERS,C OMMUNICATION, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40-41 (Martin Green-
berger ed., 1971) (noting that an abundance of information results in a scarcity of 
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arise in contract, and are solved with a different mix of private and 
public solutions, such as making contracts shorter or enforcing rea-
sonable consumer expectations.
126
One reason that servitudes present a problem of informational 
detail is that they implement a governance strategy.  Basic exclusion 
(e.g., “keep off” boundaries) is a platform upon which we can build 
governance regimes—i.e. rules of proper use.  Governance rules re-
fine and supplement the basic exclusionary regime when particular 
use conflicts are important enough.  Governance rules in the law can 
be contractual, from common law, or some combination of statute 
and regulation.
127  Servitudes are a largely private governance regime.  
One possibility here is that courts have little problem with servitudes 
as long as they can be said to refine and supplement the basic exclu-
sionary regime.  Servitudes that are not refinements but are unrelated 
(e.g., the sale or lease of a shop partially in return for free haircuts), 
or more than a mere refinement (e.g., going outside the copyright 
baseline), present information problems that normal governance   
regimes do not. 
Intellectual property servitudes arise in the context of licensing.  
An intellectual property license is like an easement in real property in 
that the default is nonrevocability.  But, intellectual property servi-
tudes are highly contractual.  The question becomes what limits, if 
any, the law should impose on intellectual property servitudes, and 
why.  The law has always been more suspicious of personal than real 
property servitudes, but this area of the law has been undertheo-
rized.
128  Recently Molly Van Houweling has explored the “new servi-
tudes” in intellectual property, examining how they implicate some of 
the traditional concerns with servitudes both more and less than do 
real and personal property servitudes.
129  In particular, she shows how 
licenses can conflict downstream, as in the cases of the GPL Version 2, 
under which the original Linux kernel was created and licensed, and 
126 See Smith, supra note 83, at 1176 (discussing boilerplate language in contracts). 
127 For the role of governance regimes in intellectual property, see Smith, supra
note 35, at 1782-98. 
128 See, e.g., Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV.L .R EV.
945, 977-87 (1928) (surveying case law and explaining objections to equitable servi-
tudes on chattels); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., The Music Goes Round and Round:  Equitable 
Servitudes and Chattels, 69 HARV.L .R EV. 1250, 1254-56 (1956) (acknowledging the scar-
city of authorities enforcing equitable servitudes on chattels).  For a recent contrac-
tarian argument, see Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI.L .R EV.
1449, 1449-55 (2004). 
129 Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO.L.J. 885, 924-50 (2008). 2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2123
the Wikipedia GNU Free Documentation License.
130  These licenses 
mandate that further works incorporating the licensed material be 
made available on the same terms; the problem comes when these 
terms of openness are detailed and potentially conflict with later vi-
sions of openness.  A later work may incorporate material that is li-
censed in two conflicting ways, which is a general problem with li-
censes that are meant to apply to somewhat remote and indefinite 
parties.  The conflict is somewhat reminiscent of water law, in which 
property rights definition is difficult because it is desirable or un-
avoidable that water rights interlock tightly (the return-flow issue in 
first appropriation is a dramatic example).
131
In both IP servitudes and water law, the difficulty of delineating 
rights with respect to the resource leads to complex interfaces be-
tween modules.  We need refinements (governance) for a variety of 
purposes, which complicates this interface when uses interact (e.g., 
nuisance and servitudes).  One difference among land, chattels, and 
intangibles is that the exclusion strategy is easier to carry out for tan-
gible property.  The baseline is clearer:  in the case of land, there is a 
physical bubble that corresponds to the module that the exclusion 
strategy provides.  In intellectual property, by contrast, attempts at ex-
clusion are necessarily artificial.  Thus, it is easier for servitudes in in-
tellectual property to lack reference to an exclusion baseline.  Admit-
tedly, some have reference to a relatively clear ex ante baseline, as 
with the Creative Commons licenses favoring use within the scope of 
the copyright.
132  But some licenses do not use this baseline and, in-
stead, go beyond it (as where rights to criticize are contracted away).
133
The conflicting-license issue would not arise if intellectual property 
were more naturally modularized; the problem is that, in principle, 
these servitudes can be about anything and can interact in any way 
with each other.  The modularity of land rights through spatially de-
fined exclusion limits the extent to which servitudes will conflict.   
Owners will be aware of what a servitude will “cover” (almost literally) 
130 Id. at 941-43. 
131 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
132 Van Houweling, supra note 129, at 938-39. 
133 See id. at 938 (providing Microsoft’s Vista EULA as an “example of a license that 
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in the case of land.
134  Unlike land, software as a resource does not en-
sure this awareness. 
Complex interfaces can reduce transferability, as in the case of wa-
ter.  In some kinds of property, those setting up property desire li-
quidity, providing more than enough incentive for standardization 
(many financial instruments are an example).
135  In other cases, idio-
syncratic rights (fancies) may “pollute” the general informational at-
mosphere, increasing information costs for others.
136  The resulting 
general need for others to be on the lookout for additional types of 
information in no predetermined format can present an externality 
that exceeds the benefits of the idiosyncracy to the transacting par-
ties.
137  The private incentives for liquidity and the size of the external-
ity, therefore, partly determine the need for standardization.  More-
over, as long as the state is involved in enforcing property rights, there 
can be economies of scope in the state’s taking on the standardization 
function.
138
Many of the issues raised in this Article manifested themselves in 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.,
139 a case recently decided 
by the U.S. Supreme Court.  In that case, the Federal Circuit had 
taken a wholly contractarian approach, concluding that the patent-
exhaustion doctrine did not apply to a method patent, thus allowing 
the patent holder to license a firm without at the same time licensing 
that firm’s customers.
140  The Supreme Court, however, reversed, hold-
ing that patent exhaustion was mandatory and that servitudes on intel-
lectual property, including patent-related restrictions on use down-
stream from a licensee, would not run.
141  These problems of 
servitudes perched between property and contract suggest intermedi-
ate possibilities.  Van Houweling, for example, suggests that the dis-
tinction made in earlier Supreme Court cases between commercial 
producing entities and individual consumers (the latter of which may 
have more of an everyday expectation of permission to use a physical 
134 If, however, we followed the legal realists and asserted that there is no core to 
the bundle of sticks of rights in land, the situation would be much more similar to the 
one that Van Houweling identifies for information goods. 
135 Merrill & Smith, supra note 99, at 47 & nn.168, 169. 
136 See id. at 26-34 (differentiating the information costs for originating parties, po-
tential successors in interest, and other market participants). 
137 Id. at 31-33. 
138 Id. at 51. 
139 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). 
140 Id. at 2115. 
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article) is potentially a good rule of thumb.
142  For one thing, those 
manufacturing under a license have more expertise and more at stake 
than consumers.
143  Accordingly, there is less reason for the law to 
worry about the processing costs of closer, more-expert dutyholders, 
particularly those with actual notice. 
B.  Remedies 
The question of remedies in patent law is now in considerable 
flux.  Until recently the Federal Circuit made injunctions almost 
automatic for infringement.  In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit, holding that courts 
deciding whether to award injunctive relief for disputes arising under 
the Patent Act must use a four-factor test said to be used traditionally 
in equity courts.
144  The majority opinion does not give much guid-
ance as to how this equitable analysis should be applied.  Chief Justice 
Roberts’s concurrence suggests that it should usually lead to an in-
junction.
145  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, on the other hand, em-
phasizes the desirability of denying injunctions when granting them 
would not be in the public interest and suggests that nonpracticing 
entities and holders of patents covering complex products might well 
be denied injunctive relief.
146  Since eBay, lower courts have denied in-
junctions in more cases than before, but injunctions still seem to be 
widely available.
147  Nonetheless, there is widespread disagreement on 
when an injunction should be denied.
148
142 See Van Houweling, supra note 129, at 932-39 (evaluating the different notice 
and information costs of licensing practices). 
143 See Smith, supra note 32, at 1173-77 (examining specialized audiences in vari-
ous areas of intellectual property). 
144 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006).  For a discussion of how the four factors and the no-
tion of “tests” do not fully accord with the traditional standard for injunctive relief, see 
John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”:  A Prescription for Appellate   
Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 695-98 (2009). 
145 See id. at 395 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (acknowledging that while historical 
practice “does not entitle a patentee to a permanent injunction or justify a general rule
that such injunctions should issue,” it is unsurprising that “courts have granted injunc-
tive relief upon a finding of infringement in the vast majority of patent cases”). 
146 Id. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
147 See, e.g., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. GlobalSantaFe Corp., 
No. 03-2910, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93408, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (granting 
injunction); Smith & Nephew, Inc. v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 466 F. Supp. 2d 978, 981 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2006) (granting injunction); z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 
437, 444 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (denying injunction); see also Benjamin Petersen, Injunctive 2126  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
Much of the worry about injunctions stems from so-called troll 
behavior, in which an entity purchases weak patents, waits for reliance 
on them (especially as a minor component of a larger project that is 
only now crucial because it is difficult to design around ex post), then 
engages in holdup, demanding compensation greatly out of propor-
tion to the contribution of the patent.
149  Defining trolls has been dif-
ficult because the broadest definitions seem overly broad:  they would 
include any nonpracticing entity (NPE)—a company that does not it-
self manufacture products using the patented invention.  Upstream 
nonmanufacturers do not seem problematic in the way that a firm 
that purchases weak patents for the purpose of bringing a nuisance 
lawsuit does.  For those most suspicious of intellectual property, trolls 
are everywhere, and something close to a compulsory license is the 
answer.  If any nonpracticing entity is treated as a troll and is unable 
to get an injunction, specialization in R&D versus manufacturing is 
problematic.  If nonpracticing and nonlicensing entities are per se 
problematic, this also gives the first potential licensee a lot of leverage.  
If the problem is weak patents, the question is whether weeding them 
out would be better than weakening the remedies, the latter of which 
could potentially affect stronger patents as well.  Perhaps business-
method patents, whatever their merits, are inadvisable because they 
drive courts in the direction of compulsory licenses in general.  eBay
itself involved a software-based business-method patent.
150
The information-cost theory can help us get a handle on these 
remedial questions.  First, the value of an injunction is not in the in-
trinsic benefits of exclusion (not that there is any such benefit in regu-
lar property).  The real question is how much, and in what ways, the 
injunctive remedy contributes to the option-maximizing and complex-
ity-managing modularity furnished by patent law.  With every attempt 
Relief in the Post-eBay World, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 193 (2008) (describing trends in 
patent-injunction cases post-eBay).
148 Compare Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX.L .R EV. 1991, 2037-38 (2007) (arguing that injunctions systematically overcom-
pensate), and Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards:  Patent Trolls and the Perils 
of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1809-12 (2007) (analogizing the patent-
troll problem to nineteenth-century “patent sharks”), with Vincenzo Denicolò, Do Pat-
ents Over-Compensate Innovators?, 22 ECON.P OL’Y 679 (2007) (finding little evidence of 
overcompensation), and John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Reme-
dies, 85 TEX.L .R EV. 2111 (2007) (critiquing the case for overcompensation). 
149 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Are Univeristies Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP.M EDIA &E NT. L.J. 611, 613-14 (2008) (describing the rise of patent holdup, or 
the “troll problem”). 
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to second-guess a patent owner’s behavior—in terms of 
(non)practicing, (non)licensing, who to deal with, and so on—patents 
are less modular.  We have partially withdrawn the delegation of de-
velopment and commercialization decisions from the owner and built 
additional context into the law’s interface between the actors. 
Nevertheless, the information-cost theory, particularly in its 
somewhat unexpected parallels to regular property, suggests limits on 
injunctions consistent with the traditional approach to equitable re-
lief.  The basic limits, familiar from regular property, are based on a 
combination of detrimental reliance and lack of notice.  Interestingly, 
notice and reliance in the presence of the danger of opportunism 
were at the heart of traditional equity.  I will argue that the informa-
tion-cost theory of property provides a rationale for equitable analysis 
as the correct safety valve for enriching the interface between other-
wise quite modular rights.  In this sense eBay can be read as a call for 
this property-style approach and should, I argue, be given a chance to 
work as a safety valve before moving, through new legislation or oth-
erwise, further toward compulsory licenses. 
Much of the problem with injunctions comes from the fear that 
the infringer did not know and reasonably could not have known 
about the patent before engaging in detrimental reliance.  As a result, 
a patent holder can capture a portion of the ex post costs of designing 
around the patent.
151  If, before the accused infringer’s investment, 
the patent is cheap to design around, but is expensive to design 
around ex post, the patent holder can wait for a share of the lower of 
(a) the ex post costs of designing around, and (b) the value of the in-
vestment.  This need not bear any relationship to the patentee’s con-
tribution.  Denying an injunction removes this holdup power but at 
the cost of the benefits derived from delegating decisions to the pat-
entee in the first place and also at the cost of valuing the contribution 
judicially.
152
Although the troll problem is seen as a problem peculiar to patent 
law, this is only true in part.  The problem is greater in patent law 
than in real property because patent boundaries are harder to deline-
ate and because patents, especially in software and business methods, 
151 See Vincenzo Denicolò et al., Revisiting Injunctive Relief:  Interpreting eBay in High-
Tech Industries with Non-Practicing Patent Holders, 4 J.COMPETITION L.&ECON. 571 (2008). 
152 See Smith, supra note 7. 2128  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
are not considered to be serving their notice function well.
153  But the 
basic structure of the problem occurs with some regularity in property 
law, most prominently in building encroachments.  In regular prop-
erty, building encroachments, which have been analogized to in-
fringement, have seen a move towards damages rather than injunc-
tions, partly in the name of avoiding the waste and huge leverage that 
an injunction would afford.
154  Similar to the concern over trolls in 
patent law, the problem with building encroachments is that a known 
boundary is much easier to bargain around ex ante than ex post.
155
Land boundaries are often treated as unproblematic compared to 
those in intellectual property,
156 but it should not be forgotten that 
surveying is an art subject to mistakes—especially in the “metes and 
bounds” system, dependent as it is on markers, angles, and lengths.
157
Importantly, it is not socially optimal to achieve absolute certainty 
about land boundaries, and innocent mistakes remain.  As Stewart 
Sterk has shown, the private incentive to measure a boundary can ex-
ceed the social benefit where property rules give great leverage ex 
post to the encroached-upon party.
158  Although he notes that perva-
sive use of liability rules can inadequately protect property, Sterk en-
dorses the use of eBay to remove excess leverage and hence over-
searching in patent law.
159  But eBay is not simply an exhortation to 
153 See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN &M ICAHEL J. MEURER,P ATENT FAILURE:H OW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 29-72 (2008). 
154 See THOMAS W. MERRILL &H ENRY E. SMITH,P ROPERTY:P RINCIPLES AND POLI-
CIES 50-56 (2007) (providing older and newer cases and explaining that “most Ameri-
can courts today would probably deny injunctive relief and award only damages” when 
encroachment is unintentional and minimal and the hardship to the defendant would 
be great if removal were required). 
155 For an illustration with a numerical example, see id. at 62-67. 
156 See, e.g., BESSEN &M UERER, supra note 153, at 53-55 (discussing the difficulties 
of mapping boundaries of technology in comparison with land); David W. Opderbeck, 
Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 171-72 (forth-
coming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1213160 (“A patent is not like a 
real property deed, which contains a precise ex ante statement of the metes and 
bounds of the entitlement.”); see also Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec. U.S.A., 
Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“A claim in a patent provides the metes and 
bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the protected invention.”). 
157 See, e.g., WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK &D ALE A. WHITMAN,T HE LAW OF PROPERTY
§ 11.2, at 820-21 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that “metes and bounds” descriptions are “of-
ten lengthy, cumbersome, and rife with potential for error” and that “they must be 
used with the greatest care,” and detailing complications). 
158 Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights,
106 MICH.L .R EV. 1285 (2008). 
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deny injunctions in cases of “excess” leverage.  I argue that the specific 
content of traditional equitable analysis is keyed to the holdup situa-
tion and provides a narrow safety valve that does less damage to the 
modular exclusion regime than would a more unstructured, pure li-
ability-rule regime of full-blown compulsory licenses. 
Before turning to the structure of the equitable test, the use of 
damages rather than injunctions in continuing trespass is limited to 
those acting in good faith—those with no knowledge of the other’s 
rights.  A bad-faith improver (i.e., one who knows that she is violating 
the other’s rights) still faces an injunction no matter how “wasteful” 
the injunction would be.  Likewise, other exceptions to the stringent 
application of trespass are keyed to good faith.  For example, in open-
range areas, animals wandering onto unenclosed land are not consid-
ered to be trespassing, but animals directed by their owner to invade 
another’s land are.
160
How does this apply to patent law?  The vagaries of the current 
willfulness standard are beyond the scope of this Article.  The infor-
mation-cost theory, however, suggests that injunctions should be of-
fered routinely against bad-faith infringers but that, because of the 
difficulties with notice, this safety valve should be somewhat more ex-
pansive than in boundary-encroachment law.  A patent that is very un-
clear or difficult to find, particularly if a result of the patentee’s delib-
erate lack of clarity, could be a factor weighing against an injunction.  
For example, I have suggested elsewhere that one possible rule would 
be that infringement only under the doctrine of equivalents, which 
extends the literal claims to cover a penumbra of hard-to-foresee addi-
tional invention space, would result only in damages and not an in-
junction.
161  Further, a patent owner can ensure that the other party 
infringes in bad faith by providing individualized notice. 
Particularly in light of the special notice problems in patent law, 
another possibility would be to borrow and strengthen the notion of 
equitable estoppel in the patent infringement context.
162  If the patent 
160 See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (noting that fencing-out 
rules “are intended to condone trespasses by straying cattle; they have no application to 
cases where they are driven upon unfenced land in order that they may feed there”). 
161 Smith, supra note 35, at 1818-19; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and 
Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, (Chicago-Kent Intellectual Prop. & Tech., Research Pa-
per No. 09-010, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330688. 
162 Currently, for equitable estoppel to apply, the patent holder must make some 
representation upon which the accused infringer reasonably relied or must otherwise 
procure the infringer’s reliance.  See Wang Labs., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., Inc., 
103 F.3d 1571, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (asserting that equitable estoppel “focuses on 2130  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
owner knows of infringement and waits until reliance occurs, she 
could be estopped from getting an injunction.  This could also be 
viewed as an application of the clean-hands maxim—although it goes 
beyond the uses of estoppel in contract, property, and patent law—
because some affirmative act or representation is usually necessary in 
order to estop the party.  Current laches doctrine already covers some 
of this problematic waiting on the part of the patent holder for reli-
ance by an innocent infringer.
163
Nonetheless, if taken seriously, the traditional equitable test is 
narrow and structured and is not an invitation to engage in a case-by-
case policy analysis dressed up in the four factors.  The factors are not 
really tests but a structured inquiry.
164  First of all, although potentially 
disappointing to the proponents of compulsory licenses, the order of 
the factors in the test—irreparable harm, inadequacy of damages, bal-
ance of hardships, and public interest—is no accident.  In equity, the 
inadequacy of the legal remedy (here damages) because of irrepara-
ble harm was jurisdictional.
165  With the fusion of law and equity this is 
no longer as important (except for jury trial) but it does potentially 
serve to cabin equitable analysis to a defined sphere, in which it would 
act in personam rather than on the world at large.  In doing so, equity 
thus circumscribed poses less of an informational burden and threat 
to stability than a more free-floating equity would.  In this way, equity 
respects the modular structure of property more than it seems to at 
first glance.
166
‘misleading’ conduct suggesting that the patentee will not enforce patent rights”); 
Bandag, Inc. v. Al Bolser’s Tire Stores, Inc., 750 F.2d 903, 925 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“One 
common thread in cases in which equitable estoppel applies is that the actor commit-
ted himself to act, and indeed acted, as a direct consequence of another’s conduct.” 
(quoting Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1983))). 
163 See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Tech. Corp., 185 F.3d 1259, 1272-74 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); Sterk, supra note 158, at 1334. 
164 Sometimes this structure takes the form of presumptions, as we will see.  For a 
discussion of how eBay has confused the issue of the role of rebuttable presumptions in 
patent injunction cases, see Golden, supra note 144, at 696-98. 
165 See generally DAN B. DOBBS, 1 LAW OF REMEDIES:D AMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION
§ 2.11(2) (2d ed. 1993).  Although it takes us beyond the scope of this Article, some of 
the skepticism voiced by Dobbs and even more forcefully by Laycock about the content 
of the irreparable-injury requirement, DOUGLAS LAYCOCK,T HE DEATH OF THE IRREPA-
RABLE INJURY RULE (1991), and the fact that one can point to cases showing all sorts of 
injuries as irreparable, may reflect more of the discretionary nature of the decision 
making than a lack of any bite in the standard. 
166 Interestingly, one of the main innovations of equity, the trust, allows complex-
ity to be walled off and largely confined to the parties to the trust, rather than third 
parties. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 124, at 849; Smith, supra note 32, at 1165-66. 2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2131
The remaining factors—balance of the hardships and public in-
terest—are also best understood as narrow safety valves.  First of all, 
there is balancing and then there is balancing.  The balancing called 
for in the traditional equitable test is not full-blown cost-benefit analy-
sis or an even weighing of hardship on both sides.  Instead, traditional 
equitable analysis asked whether someone otherwise entitled to an in-
junction should not get one, in the judge’s discretion, in light of a 
grossly disproportionate hardship on the defendant.
167  Because equity 
incorporated a standard of behavior and an injunction implements a 
sanction rather than a price, it is not surprising that decision making 
here is not a matter of equipoise but rather a rough matter of avoid-
ing egregious errors in an otherwise robust system of injunctive re-
lief.
168  Not surprisingly, writers sensitive to this aspect of the equitable 
test have suggested that disproportionate hardship should be the 
standard in building encroachments
169 and, interestingly, in patent law 
itself.
170
Likewise, the public interest standard in equity is not an invitation 
to try to measure social welfare on a case-by-case basis.  Rather, it is 
another safety valve in which a case otherwise eligible for an injunc-
tion would pose a major harm to third parties.  In patent law this most 
often has been associated with the public health.
171  There is little sup-
port for comprehensive cost-benefit analysis under the traditional 
public interest test.  It is quite doubtful that judges are up to that 
167 See, e.g., 42 AM.J UR.2 D Injunctions § 35 (2005) (“Even if the wrongful acts are 
indisputable, an injunction may be denied if the payment of money would afford sub-
stantial redress and if the injunction would subject the defendant to grossly dispropor-
tionate hardship.” (footnote omitted)). 
168 Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM.L .R EV. 1523, 1523-37 (1984). 
169 See Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral:  The Dominance of Property 
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2102 (1997) (“[E]ssentially the appropriate solution is to al-
low injunctive relief when the relative balance of convenience is anything close to 
equal, but to deny it (in its entirety if necessary) when the balance of convenience runs 
strongly in favor of the defendant.  The usual presumption is that the exploitation risk 
is greater than the holdout risk.  This presumption can be reversed by a showing of the 
dramatic difference in values . . . .”). 
170 Herbert F. Schwartz, Injunctive Relief in Patent Infringement Suits, 112 U. PA.L .
REV. 1025, 1045-46 (1964) (suggesting a “grossly disparate hardship” standard); cf.
Doug Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v. MercExchange, 
27 REV.L ITIG. 63, 85 (2007) (“However, disagreeing with the Supreme Court in eBay, I 
think that balancing the hardships should be a defendant’s affirmative defense to an 
injunction rather than an element of an injunction in plaintiff’s case-in-chief.”). 
171 See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934) 
(dissolving an injunction against an infringing sewage-disposal system). 2132  University of Pennsylvania Law Review  [Vol. 157: 2083
task,
172 and this Article argues that any significant move in that direc-
tion carries the costs of undermining the modular structure of entitle-
ments that allows actors to deal with options in a decentralized fashion. 
Finally, traditional equitable analysis also used the flexibility built 
into injunctive relief to moderate hardship.
173  Thus, injunctions can 
be tailored to the harm and can be delayed in order to give an inno-
cent infringer time to design around.
174
More speculatively, the information-cost theory of property and 
intellectual property suggests one source of the controversies over li-
censing and remedies.  In an earlier time, equity served as a safety 
valve in a strictly defined domain.
175  In that domain, the discretion af-
forded to judges permitted them to combat opportunism without a 
widespread weakening of property rights—or so went the theory.  In 
any event, in our legal-realist-inspired era, after the fusion of law and 
equity, we tend to get a polarization of approaches:  either everything 
should be ex post and equitably based on policymaking, or the legal 
rules should be ex ante and across the board without exceptions.   
Both sides in the controversies over intellectual property can invoke 
either of these approaches, although the intellectual property skeptics 
are more likely to prefer the equitable approach given the current 
state of per se rules. 
172 It is instructive here that even in areas of law like nuisance that are said to in-
volve more even-style balancing, courts do not often engage in true balancing, much 
less cost-benefit analysis.  Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules, supra note 7, at 990-1007.  
Even in the face of obvious waste as in the context of oil fields, limited judicial compe-
tence has probably prevented much intervention by courts to prevent waste.  Id. at 
1027-37. 
173 Epstein, supra note 169, at 2101, cites Quinn v. American Spiral Spring & Manu-
facturing Co., 141 A. 855 (Pa. 1928), as an example. 
174 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 148, at 2037-38. 
175 For instance, equity would act in personam and would “follow the law,” espe-
cially with respect to property rights.  See, e.g., 1 JOSEPH STORY,C OMMENTARIES ON EQ-
UITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA §§ 26-27, 30, 64 
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 13th ed. 1999) (1853) (differentiat-
ing between courts of law and equity and explaining the various interpretations of eq-
uity “follow[ing] the line”); Howard W. Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 ARK.L .N OTES
29; Charles M. Gray, The Boundaries of the Equitable Function, 20 AM.J .L EGAL HIST. 192, 
202-06 (1976) (illustrating how courts of equity were prohibited from addressing real 
estate disputes); Roger Young & Stephen Spitz, Essay, SUEM—Spitz’s Ultimate Equitable 
Maxim:  In Equity, Good Guys Should Win and Bad Guys Should Lose, 55 S.C. L. REV. 175, 
177 (2003) (exploring nine equitable principles used by the South Carolina courts, 
including “[e]quity follows the law” and “[e]quity acts in personam, not in rem”). 2009]  Institutions and Indirectness in Intellectual Property 2133
CONCLUSION
The information-cost theory points to some benefits from the 
modularity of intellectual property stemming from the structure that 
it shares with regular property:  a base of modular exclusion and an 
interface of governance rules.  Because information is nonrival, the 
benefits of modularity must be weighed against the costs of exclusion.  
Key to its operation, however, are the indirectness between the 
mechanism and the interests that modularity serves, in terms of the 
appropriation and contracting over returns from rival inputs to inven-
tion and commercialization.  By contrast, legal-realist-style definitions 
of property in the NIE, sounding in risk rather than information costs 
and uncertainty, have trouble explaining why exclusion-based intellec-
tual property rights make any sense at all. 